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Cho makes a good start by winning the first game of the 5th Meijin title match.

CONTENTS

Go World News	2
5th Gosei Title	6
Playoff, Game One	6
Game Two	9
Title Match, Game One	11
Game Two	15
Game Three	19
Game Four	24
Profile of a Prodigy	28
5th Meijin Title, Game One	29
Special Game Commentary: 5th Meijin Title, Game Two	33
Strange Fusekis – Past and Present: Kuwahara's 1–3–5	41
Good and Bad Style	43
The Great Joseki Debate	45
1980 German Championship	52
Forcing Moves	54
1980 European Championship	57
Index to Issues 17 to 22	59
Page from Go History: The Great Senchi – Forerunner of New Fuseki	62

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GO WORLD NEWS

Cho Chikun Wins Meijin Title

After eighteen years of study in Japan, the twenty-four year old Korean player Cho Chikun 8-dan has achieved his ambition of winning the Meijin title. Cho defeated Otake 4-1, with one game declared drawn, in the 5th Meijin title match. This is Cho's eighth title, but it is the first time he has won one of the top titles. The results:

Game 1 (Sept. 10, 11). Cho (W) won by resig.

Game 2 (Sept. 17, 18) Cho (B) won by resig.

Game 3 (Oct. 1, 2). Otake (B) won by resig.

Game 4 (Oct. 8, 9). Drawn

Game 5 (Oct. 22, 23). Cho (W) won by resig.

Game 6 (Nov. 5, 6). Cho (B) won by 1½ points.

The draw in the 4th game is unprecedented in modern tournament go and will not be repeated. While in byo-yomi, Cho retook a ko without having made a ko threat, but he asked the game-recorder first if it was his turn to take the ko and the game-recorder said yes. Normally Cho would have forfeited the game, but since the practice of allowing a player to check with the game-recorder whether it is his turn to move or to take a ko etc. has become established, the referee (ironically, Ishida Yoshio, who forfeited a game to Kajiwara in the Pro Best Ten playoff in 1971 for the same mistake) and the tournament sponsors decided that since the game-recorder had made a mistake, the game should be drawn. This ambiguity in the rules was promptly clarified by the Nihon Ki-in, which ruled that hereafter the player himself should bear complete and sole responsibility for his moves.

Otake Becomes Kisei Challenger

When two players are both in good form, they seem to run into each other all the time. The last important match of the 1980 tournament year, the three-game playoff to decide the challenger to Fujisawa Shuko, holder of the Kisei title, once again featured a clash between Otake Hideo and Cho Chikun thus giving Otake an early opportunity to take revenge for his defeat in the Meijin title match. Otake won the playoff 2-1 and will meet Fujisawa in the 5th Kisei title match. This is an ideal pairing, for these two players are known for their preference for artistic go over percentage go.

Full results of the 4th Kisei Third Stage:

Quarter-finals) Sakata beat Takemiya, Cho b. Sekiyama, Rin b. Kato, Otake b. Hashimoto Shoji

Semifinals) Cho b. Sakata, Otake b. Rin

Final) Game 1 (Nov. 27). Otake (B) beat Cho by 4½ points.

Game 2 (Dec. 11). Cho (B) won by resig.

Game 3 (Dec. 18). Otake (B) won by 3½ points.

Kato Defends Tengen and Oza Titles

Kato Masao seems to have recovered from the slump he fell into in the first half of 1980 and he has managed to hang on to half of the titles with which he started the year. In the 6th Tengen title match he defeated Yamabe Toshiro 9-dan 3-0 and in the 28th Oza title match he rebuffed the challenge of his fellow Kitani disciple Ishida Yoshio 9-dan 2-0. Full results:

6th Tengen

Game 1 (Nov. 12). Kato (B) won by resig.

Game 2 (Nov. 26). Kato (W) won by resig.

Game 3 (Dec. 4). Kato (B) won by resig.

28th Oza

Game 1 (Nov. 5). Kato (W) won by resig.

Game 2 (Nov. 19). Kato (B) won by 2½ points.

Fukui Wins P.M.'s Cup

Fukui Masaaki 7-dan, a disciple of Iwamoto Kaoru, won the 24th Prime Minister's Cup by defeating O Rissei (Wang Li-ch'eng) 2-1 in the final. Fukui won the 7-dan section in the 5th Kisei tournament, but this is his first title. The results:

Game 1 (Sept. 17). O (B) won by resig.
Game 2 (Sept. 24). Fukui (B) won by 2½ points.
Game 3 (Oct. 8). Fukui (W) won by 9½ points.

36th Honinbo League

The final place in the league was taken by Honda Kuniyoshi 9-dan of the Kansai Ki-in, by defeating former Honinbo Ishida Yoshio in the final elimination round. Kato and Rin have made good starts, with two wins, while Sakata Eio has slipped up, with two losses. Other progress scores: Cho 1-0, Hashimoto Shoji 1-1, Shiraishi 1-1, Honda 0-1, Sakai 0-1.

6th Meijin League

The three vacant places in the league have been taken by Yamabe Toshiro 9-dan, Shimamura Toshihiro 9-dan and Sato Masaharu 7-dan.

Results of the 1st round:

Sato beat Shimamura, Kato b. Rin, Takemiya
b. Yamabe, Kobayashi Koichi b. Sakata.

Oteai Reform Runs into Opposition

In GW16 we reported that the Nihon Ki-in had decided to make a wholesale reform of the oteai ranking system, but the new system has met with various objections from the players. It proved impossible to reach a consensus on the proposed reforms, and the result has been that no oteai was held at all. The stopgap solution which was finally agreed on was to hold the old-style oteai for 1980 and 1981, in the hope that agreement could be reached on the new system by the end of 1981. In order to catch up, what should have been the 1980 spring session of the oteai was started in mid-December and it and the 1980 autumn session will have to be completed by



Go for giants – a demonstration of a large scale version of the game was staged by the Maerz Go Club Linz during the City Ringelei. The board was made up of 1/2m. sq. paving stones in the city square and the stones were large plastic plates. The demonstration attracted a lot of attention and gained some new members for the go club. Linz will host the 1981 European Go Congress. (Photo from Anton Steininger)

spring of 1981. One of the main sticking points was the proposal that 9-dans should also take part in the new system.

Japanese Representatives in 3rd W.A.G.C.

The Japanese representatives in the 3rd World Amateur Go Championship will be Hirata Hiro-nori and Murakami Bunsho, who came 1st and 2nd in the Nihon Ki-in Ch'ship, and Kamekura Yoshiko, the 1980 Women's Champion.

1980 Polish Championship

The 2nd Polish Championship was held in Warsaw from the 30th October to the 2nd November and was won for the second year in a row by Janusz Kraszek, who will again represent Poland in the World Amateur Go Championship. Second was Krzysztof Moszczynski and third Wlodzimierz Malinowski.

1980 New Zealand Championship

The 1980 N.Z. Championship was held at Otago University in Dunedin and was won for the third successive year by Graeme Parmenter 4-dan of Dunedin. Barry Phease 1-dan of Auckland took second place, while third and fourth respectively were Ray Tomes 3-dan and Bob Talbot 1-dan, both of Auckland. Since Graeme Parmenter had withdrawn from the running for the New Zealand place in the W.A.G.C. before the tournament, Barry Phease will be the N.Z. representative in March.

1980 Swiss Championship

Hans-Peter Baumann 3-dan of Basle defended his title of Swiss Champion with a 2-0 victory over the challenger, Patrice Gostelli 3-dan of Geneva, in their best-of-three match. Since Baumann played in the world championship last year, however, the Swiss Go Federation has selected Gostelli as their representative for 1981.

3rd Open Go Championship of Belgrade

The championship group in this tournament, held on the 1st and 2nd November, was won by Milosav Jukiv 1-dan of Nis. Second was Koncer 3-dan of Rijeka and third Andelic 2-dan of Belgrade. The kyu groups were won respectively by Zlatanovic 2-kyu, Smiljevic 5-kyu, Randelovic 8-kyu and Stankovic 13-kyu.

1980 Danish Go Championship

This event was held on the 17th-19th October and was won by Dix Sandbeck 2-dan, who will represent Denmark in the 3rd World Amateur Go Championship. Second was Mogens Aalung and third Torben Zahle, the defending champion.

The B Group was won by Jens Toft 4-kyu and the handicap group was won by Mads Clausen 15-kyu.

1980 Canadian Open Go Championship

The Third Canadian Open Go Championship was hosted by the Quebec Go Association in Montreal from the 11th to the 13th October. The six round Swiss McMahon event was directed by Tibor Bogner and was the biggest tournament ever held in Canada, attracting a total of sixty participants. The results:

Open Champion: Ichiro Tominaga 5-dan (Calgary)

2nd: Bruce Wilcox 5-dan (Boston)

3rd: Dr. Keiji Shimizu 6-dan (Vancouver). As the top placed Canadian citizen, Dr. Shimizu became Canada's representative in the 3rd W.A.G.C.

The next championship will be held in Vancouver.

1980 French Championship

The 1980 French Championship was won by Andre Moussa 4-dan, who defeated last year's champion Jean Michel 4-dan 2-0 in the final, held on the 15th and 16th November in Grenoble. Seventy players participated in the championship, which was held in four stages. Third place was taken by Frederic Donzet 3-dan.

1980 Argentine Championship

This championship consists of a round robin tournament among the top five players, playing twice with each opponent. The results:

1st: Fernando Aguilar 7-1

2nd: Sakamoto 5-2

3rd: Eduardo Lopez Herrero 4-4

Daniel Leiberman 1-5

Robert Alaluf 1-6

Although not all the games have been finished, the main placings have been decided. Fernando Aguilar won the title for the second year in a row, but at he will not be available next March due to university exams, the next placed Argentine citizen, Lopez Herrero, will be the representative in the world championship.

International Go Congress Luxembourg

1st prize: flight-ticket to the Orient

Many other big prizes

The Fuseki Go Club du Luxembourg is organising a large-scale international go tournament, to be held from the 1st to the 3rd May, 1981, with the sponsorship of Korean Air Lines and the Mamer Town Administration. The tournament

will be divided into four sections:

A Group: 3-dan and above

B Group: 1-kyu to 2-dan

C Group: 2 to 9-kyu

D Group: Beginners to 10-kyu

The tournament will be run on the Swiss system with the following time limits:

A: 1½ hours, 30 seconds byo-yomi, 5 rounds

B: 1½ hours, 30 secs., 5 rounds

C: 1 hr., 30 secs., 7 round handicap tourn.

D: 1 hr., 30 secs., 7 round handicap tourn.

Prizes

A: return air ticket to Tokyo or Taipei, offered by Korean Air Lines

B, C, D: portable TV sets

Numerous other prizes for 2nd and 3rd places in each group.

Venue: In Mamer, a little town about 7 miles from Luxembourg City at the new school at number 7, rue du Millenaire.

Time: The tournament starts on the 1st May, but the Congress opens on the 30th April, on which day there will be a lecture/demonstration by Mr. Chang-ki Ing of the China Wei-ch'i Association on 'The Chinese Rules of Go'. On the evening of the 2nd May there will be a reception for all participants.

Other congress activities: phantom go, family go, films, slides etc. Simultaneous demonstrations by a fifteen member Chinese delegation of professional and strong amateur players. One or more Nihon Ki-in professionals will also visit the congress.

Accommodation: Free for those with sleeping bags. Hotel reservations, camping and youth hostel available.

Registration deadline: 31st March, 1981. Official application forms are now being prepared.

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Shusaku also made great contributions to the development of go theory. His famous ‘Shusaku style’ fuseki pattern laid the foundations of modern fuseki theory and is still popular today. In Japan his games are considered exemplary and are required study for all serious students of go. In fact, the first task invariably assigned to would-be professionals or insei is to go through his complete games. Go Seigen is one example of a famous player who studied Shusaku thoroughly in his formative period.

This book gives a unique and detailed insight into the world of nineteenth century Japanese go. Apart from the castle games mentioned above, highlights include:

Shusaku’s precocious triumph over Gennan Inseki, the arch-enemy of the Honinbo house. Their series produced the most famous move in go history, ‘the ear-reddening move of Shusaku’.

All the games from the famous twenty-three game series in which Shusaku finally defeated his main rival, Ota Yuzo.

Shusaku’s games with his teacher, Shuwa, the 14th Honinbo, which contain some of the most interesting and subtle go of the period.

And many others, amounting in all to over sixty games with detailed commentary, together with an additional selection of about a hundred of his best games.

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5th Gosei Title

This year the mini-league of five players which was previously the feature of the Gosei tournament was abandoned and in its place a best-of-three playoff between the finalists was instituted to decide the challenger. The drawback of the league, apparently, was that with only four games to play, some members would drop out of the running very quickly and their remaining games would become meaningless, since one could not retain a place in the league for the following year. With the new system of a best-of-three final, as in the Kisei title, one now has in effect two successive Gosei title matches.

The first playoff under the new system matched two leading representatives of the Nihon Ki-in and the Kansai Ki-in. The latter, incidentally, is having a better than average tournament year, doing well in the Tengen, Kisei and Judan tournaments as well, for example, though a top title is still proving elusive.

Gosei Playoff Game One

White: Honda Kunihisa 9-dan

Black: Otake Hideo, Meijin & Judan

komi: 5½; time: 5 hours each

date: 19th June, 1980; played at the Nihon Ki-in




Figure 1 (1 - 43)

Figure 1 (1 - 43)

Black 13. Otake avoids 'a', as he dislikes large-


scale josekis.

White 14. White 'b' is more usual.


Black 17 is big; it aims next at attacking at 18.

Black 21. Premature, according to Otake. He regretted not jumping first to 28; if White 'c' next, as is probable, Black could then play 21. Otake found being capped at White 28 unpleasant.

Black 31. Black could also live in the corner with the sequence in Dia. 1. This would leave his group above a little thin, but he would have the peep at 'a'; since he also has 'd' in the figure, he should not come under too much pressure.



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

White 34. If at 1 in Dia. 2, Black gets too much territory in the corner in the sequence to 8.

White 38. White 41—Black 39 might seem more profitable, but then Black 'e' would become sente, threatening a ko in the corner.

Figure 2 (44 - 100)

White 50. This natural counterattack leads to a





Figure 2 (44 - 100)




Dia. 3


gripping fight.

Black 51. Otake regretted not going in further, to 1 in Dia. 3. The sequence there would enable Black to settle his group quickly.


Black 73. Cho Chikun recommended giving atari at 1 in Dia. 4 instead. Capturing two stones in the sequence to 9 would give Black greater thickness than he gets in the game.



Dia. 4



Dia. 5



Dia. 6

White 80 is forced. If White connects at 1 in Dia. 5, Black captures five stones with 2 to 6. (If Black plays 88 in the game, White can answer at 'a'.)

Black 85. Otake regretted this move, commenting that it was preferable to build thickness with 1 and 3 in Dia. 6. If White then peeped at 4, Black could counter-peep at 5 before connecting at 7. Since he has the peep at 'a' next, he can

counterattack with 'b', so this bottom group will not get into much trouble.

White 86 is a sharp move. Connecting at 89 would be bad because of the Black 'a'-'b' combination shown in Dia. 6.

Black secures a lot of territory with 89, but White gets excellent thickness by cutting at 90. Cho and Otake agreed that White was ahead.

Black 97. Played to set up a squeeze.





Figure 3 (101 - 124)



Dia. 7

Figure 3 (101 - 124)

White 2 is the losing move. Cho's comment: 'White 2 is unbelievable. White should have at 1 in Dia. 7 instead. The continuation to 4 would be forced, after which White could play first at the bottom with 5 and 7, then switch to 9. White has taken profit at the top left, so he should just discard the stones around 1. Letting Black get the perfect squeeze to 7 in the figure is terrible. At one blow, this tilts the game in Black's favour.'

White 10. A necessary reinforcement, but painful, as it takes no points.

Black 11. Black 'a' would also be good.

White 12. If at 'b', Black would play 'c', making it almost impossible to invade the corner.




Figure 4 (125 - 160)

Figure 4 (125 - 160)


White 26 secures life. If Black 'a', then White 'b', Black 34, White 'c'.

White 28 is bad, as the exchange for 29 strengthens Black. White should keep open the aji of a contact play at 29.

Black 39 is a careless oversight. After White 40, Black cannot pull out his stone with Black 51, because of White 'd', Black 53, White 'e', Black 'f', White 'g'.

White 46 is the move which makes the game irretrievably lost. White's last chance to make a fight of it, according to Cho, is to follow Dia. 8.

Dia. 8. Extending at 1 is the only move. After




Dia. 8



Honda Kuniyoshi

Born 15 June, 1945 in Ishikawa prefecture. Became a disciple of Hashimoto Utao in 1959. Shodan in 1961, 9-dan in 1973. Played in the 9th, 10th, 11th and 13th Meijin leagues, member of the current (36th) Honinbo league. Visited China in 1973. Is one of the top players of the Kansai Ki-in.



Dia. 9

Black 2, the sequence to 15 is forced. Black would next attack the white group at the bottom with 16, but White seems in no danger of dying. This result might still leave Black ahead, but it would be a close game, so White would have some chance of winning. Note that instead of 3 —

Dia. 9. Tempting though it seems, White cannot give atari at 3. After the sequence to 20, Black seems certain to kill the white group on the right.

Figure 5 (161 - 191)

White 62 is necessary. If White connected at 63, Black 62 would place the bottom right white group in serious danger. However, White comes under unbearable pressure when Black cuts at 63 and, as it turns out, he cannot save all his groups.

Black 69 threatens the eye-shape of White's




Figure 5 (161 - 191)

group, but White has a clever move at 80 and up to 86 just manages to secure two eyes.

Black 87 is the finishing blow: there is no way for this group also to get two eyes.

This must have been quite a disappointing start to the playoff for Honda, for at one stage he did take a definite lead over Otake Meijin. It all came to naught because of his bad mistake in strategy with 102 in Figure 3.

White resigns after Black 191.

Game Two

White: Otake Hideo

Black: Honda Kunihisu

date: 3rd July, 1980; played at the Kansai Ki-in







Figure 1 (1 - 55) ko: 38, 43, 46



Dia. 1



Dia. 2



Dia. 3

Figure 1 (1 - 55)

Black 7 is unusual — it might even be a new move. Black 'a' instead would make the so-called 'mini Chinese style' pattern, which is fairly popular.

Black 11 and 13 are determined moves, staking Black's game on a moyo at the top right. White 14 is necessary; if at 1 in Dia. 1, Black would cut at 2, thus building up his moyo.

Black 17. The natural point in relation to 9—13, though Black 35 would also be possible. If instead of 17, Black played at 21, a really large-scale move, White would invade at 37.

Black 29. The strongest answer is Black 1 in Dia. 2. However, White 2 and 4 would create a lot of aji at the top.

Black 39. The severest move is Black 1 in Dia. 3, but this permits White to start a serious ko fight with 2. At the moment Black could fight this ko, but White would not start it immediately but would wait until the most favourable moment. Black would thus find himself with a time-bomb ticking away inside his camp.

White 44 concludes the fight for central influence. White's moyo is clearly larger, but Black's is closer to being actual territory.

Black 45. If Black finished off the ko by taking at 52, he would secure a territory of nearly one hundred points. However, White would then play at 48 and there would be no way of guessing how many points he would end up with. It seems safer to invade at 45 in order to reduce White's moyo to more manageable proportions.

After White 52, Black could get a ko in the corner, but with weaknesses at 'b' and 'c', he could not hope to win it. Black therefore chooses to make another invasion.





Figure 2 (56 - 100)
80: ko



Dia. 4


Figure 2 (56 - 100)

Black 73. The possibility of a ko, starting with White 100, remains, but Black does not have time to reinforce. Because his two stones above have been weakened, he wants to help them somehow, but moving out directly would just present White with an ideal target for attack. He therefore plays the two-pronged move of Black 73, threatening either to link up or to complete his moyo. However, Miyamoto Naoki recommended playing more boldly here, with 1 in Dia. 4. Black 5 would secure a connection, while if White played 4 at 5, Black 4 would seal off a huge territory.

White 82. White could easily capture the two stones on the left, but that would not be enough.

Black 83. A dubious move, as the exchange for 84 helps White. Black should follow Dia. 5.

Dia. 5. Black should play at 1 immediately. If White cuts with 2 and 4, Black has a good peep at 5. If White 'a', then Black 'b'; if instead White 'c', then Black 'd', White 'e', Black 'b', leaving



Dia. 5

Black with the peep at 'f' to look forward to. The Black 83 - White 84 exchange in the figure invalidates this approach.

Black manages to live with 89 to 99, but at the cost of giving White the large point of 98. White also gets sente to invade at 100 before Black has a chance to defend at 'a'.




Figure 3 (101 - 142)
15: ko

Figure 3 (101 - 142)


White 16 may seem a funny ko threat, since Black can ignore it yet still live with 19. However, White's real aim is an attack on the black group below with 20.

Black 21. Probably the strongest answer. Black 1 in Dia. 6 looks more risky.

Black 39. A clever cut - for the first time Black looks like getting his second eye.

Figure 4 (143 - 184)

Black 51 makes good shape and a second eye



Dia. 6





Figure 4 (143 - 184)

46: connects; 68, 71: ko; 73: connects

looks imminent. One might assume that White suffers quite a setback if Black lives, for all his centre territory has disappeared. However, the truth of the matter is revealed when White extends at 56: in order to live, Black has to sacrifice his group on the left. It's a frightening thought, but Otake must have anticipated something like this result when he played 16 to 20 in the previous figure.

Note that if White kept trying to kill the bottom group with 56, he would only give Black the chance to stage an upset.



Dia. 7

Dia. 7. If White 1, Black cuts with 2 and 4. Since White does not have two eyes either, this will be a semeai. Black would welcome this fight.

Black plays a few extra moves, but he is hopelessly behind. Honda fought aggressively in this game, but he was no match for the sheer brilliance of Otake.

Black resigns after White 184.

Gosei Title Match, Game One

Before this match began, it would have been hard to pick a favourite, for both players were enjoying great form. Otake had recently captured the Judan title, while Cho had the outstanding record of 23 wins to 6 losses. Perhaps Otake had the edge in motivation, for he had to take revenge on Cho for his 0-3 loss of the Gosei title last year.




Figure 1 (1 - 21)

White: Otake Hideo, Meijin & Judan

Black: Cho Chikun, Gosei

komi: 5½; time: 5 hours each

date: 23rd July; played at Kanazawa

Figure 1 (1 - 21)

White 8. Otake's favourite pincer - not many other professionals play it.

Black 11. Black usually exchanges 'a' for White 21 first, but Cho was concerned that White would peep at 'b' the instant he played 'a'. White could then aim at playing 'c' later on.

White 20. Should be at 'd', according to Otake. White's low posture here made a difference later on.

Black 21. If at 'e', White will switch to 'f'.





Figure 2 (22 - 53)



Dia. 1

Figure 2 (22 - 53)


White 26 is the most aggressive move. More usual would be pushing up at 1 in Dia. 1, followed by invading at 3. Black would counter with 4, but this fight would not be as tense as that in the game.

Black 29. Cutting at 36 would be bad - White would defend solidly at 35.


Black 33. Black 1 in Dia. 2 is bad, as White connects at 2, then cuts off three stones with 4 and 6. White 'a' will also be sente, which may help if White invades to the right.

White 34. If at 35, Black descends at 'a', preventing White from linking up.


Black 39 is wrong, according to Cho. Black should defend the top with 1 in Dia. 3. If White




Dia. 2



Dia. 3



Dia. 4



Dia. 5

2, Black defends at 3, after which White would move out with 4.

White 40. White returns the favour by going wrong also. Black 41 severely limits the freedom of movement of the two white stones on the side, while this gain for Black makes his three stones at the top lighter. Instead of 40 -

Dia. 4. White should invade immediately at 1. Black will probably answer at 2, giving up his three stones. White might exchange 'a' for Black 'b' before capturing with 3 etc. Following this diagram loses its meaning once White has exchanged 40 for 41.

White 42 is a frightening move. If Black intercepts with 1 in Dia. 5, White plans to invade at 2, then hane at 4. The continuation is forced. Because the $\triangle$ stone gives him the threat of connecting with 'a', White is ahead in the semeai. Without $\triangle$, Black would win the fight with Black 'b', White 'c', Black 'd'. Incidentally, Otake spent thirty-four minutes on White 42, the slowest move

of the game. A casual observer might not appreciate the analysis behind this invasion.

White 48. White does not like the exchange for 49, but it is better than letting Black build thickness with 'b', White 'c', Black 48.




Figure 3 (54 - 100)
ko: 92, 95, 98

Figure 3 (54 - 100)

White 58 invites the invasion at 61. The usual idea would be to extend to 'a', but that would give Black a good move at 81, helping to solidify Black's corner.

Black 65 is a good move. Even if White plays 1 in Dia. 6 to prevent Black from connecting his groups, Black can get a living shape with 2 to 8.

Black 67 gives White a chance. If Black had played more calmly, pulling back at 1 in Dia. 7, he would have kept a secure lead. If White 2, Black could attack with 3 while taking territory on the right.


White 70. White can escape because the ladder favours him.

Black 77. Cho regretted not following Dia. 8.

Dia. 8. White forces with 2 and 4, then pushes through with 6 and 8 etc., but Black captures an extra two stones up to 19. This result would probably leave Black with a slight lead.


White 82, 84. A brilliant combination which secures a ko. If Black had played 83 at 1 in Dia. 9, White would kill him outright with 2 and 4. This tesuji is known as 'the raccoon dog drumming on its belly' (tanuki no hara-tsuzumi).

Black 85. Playing the ko immediately with 1




Dia. 6

Dia. 7



Dia. 8

Dia. 9



Dia. 10

Dia. 11

etc. in Dia. 10 is best. Cho apparently overlooked White 88.

White 90. A slip by Otake. He should first give atari at 1 in Dia. 11. This way Black will not have eye-shape if he loses the ko, while even if White loses, he can still live in the corner with 'a'.

Black 93 is a son-ko (a threat which loses points), but that cannot be helped.

Gosei Title Winners

- 1st (1976): Kato (defeated Otake 3-2)
- 2nd (1977): Kato (defeated Takemiya 3-0)
- 3rd (1978): Otake (defeated Kato 3-1)
- 4th (1979): Cho Chikun (defeated Otake 3-0)
- 5th (1980): Otake (defeated Cho 3-1)

Gosei Prizemoney

- 1st prize: ¥2,800,000
- 2nd prize: ¥560,000
- Match fee for title match - title-holder: ¥1,200,000;
challenger: ¥800,000
- Match fee for playoff: ¥300,000 each





Figure 4 (101 - 146)
4: ko



Dia. 12

Figure 4 (101 - 146)


White 2. Ironically, White has to play a ko threat that helps Black to get eye-shape. However, finishing off the ko with 6 clearly puts White in the lead.

White 14 makes miai of 24 and connecting to the top.


White 16. Cho: 'If White had played simply, with 1 and 3 in Dia. 12, the game would have been over. White 16, cautiously reinforcing the left side group, is slack. Extending at 19 revitalises Black's whole game.'

Black 19 sets up a three-way attack. Afterwards, Otake commented that this move gave White a lost game.

White 26. Defending the centre and right with White 27 would be preferable, in Cho's opinion.



Dia. 13



Dia. 14

White could then stake the game on saving his group at the bottom. Cho did not feel confident that he would have been able to capture it.

Black 27 attacks on a large scale. Black 39 would have been more solid.

White 28. Because of Black 27, White has the chance to stake the game on an attempt to save all his group with 1 etc. in Dia. 13. Alternatively, he could follow a similar strategy with White 30 at 1 in Dia. 14. Cho felt that either of these diagrams would have made a very close game. Perhaps because he was disheartened by his slack play, however, Otake passed up these opportunities.

White 38. If at 39, Black finishes him off with a hanekomi at 'a'.

White 40 captures the group at the bottom, but this is hardly a fair exchange.

Figure 5 (147 - 200)

Black 73. Black 77 would be better.





Figure 5 (147 - 200)



Dia. 15

Black 75. If Black carelessly answers at 2 in Dia. 15, White counters with 3 to 9, ensuring the capture of the stones above or those below.




Figure 6 (201 - 248)

14: takes (above 13); 15: retakes; 28: connects; 40: atari (below 13); 47: connects (above 13)

Black 79. Better omitted, as Black could then aim at 'a'.

Black 89. Cho had been in byo-yomi for quite a while, but when he played here, he was confident that he had a win.

White 100. White 'b' is a little bigger.

Figure 6 (201 - 248)

Otake is unable to narrow the gap in this figure. Although his brilliant tesuji in Figure 3 had given him the lead, his later play had lacked severity. Cho thus got off to a good start in the series. If one includes the title match last year, he now had four straight wins against Otake in the Gosei tournament.

Black wins by $4\frac{1}{2}$ points.

Game Two

White: Cho Chikun

Black: Otake Hideo

date: 1st August, 1980; played in Hiroshima




Figure 1 (1 - 18)

Figure 1 (1 - 18)

White 6 is an unusually leisurely move for Cho. White 'a' would be the standard move here, but that would let Otake play one of his favourite fuseki patterns with Black 'b'.

White 10. Developing rapidly with 'c' is also possible, but it seems better not to let Black build thickness by attaching at 'a'.

Black 13. Black is concerned that if he just extends to 'd', White might ignore him, as 'e' and 'f' would be miai. Surprisingly, White ignores the closer move at 13 anyway.





Figure 2 (19 - 50)



Dia. 1

Figure 2 (19 - 50)


Black 21. Switching elsewhere in the midst of the fighting at the top is a little strange. Black should attack at 36. An alternative, suggested by Cho, is Black 1 in Dia. 1.

Dia. 1. Attacking with 1 is a standard approach. White might settle his group with 2 and 4, then invade at 6, but Black is helped by the addition of the ▲ stone, so he can fight back with confidence with 7.

Black's aim with 21 was to initiate an attack on White's group here, but White adroitly defends in sente with 22, then switches back to the top, invading at 24. According to Otake, Black 21 'almost became the losing move'. Incidentally, although White would like to force with 'a' as well before switching to 24, he is afraid that Black might counterattack with 'b'.

Black 27. Black cannot play the standard tesuji of 1 in Dia. 2, so White has his own way at the top.

Dia. 2. If Black 1, the continuation to 12 is forced. White then cuts with 14 and 16 before living up to 24. This is a painful result for Black. He cannot omit the reinforcement at 25, so



Dia. 2

9: ko; 17: connects

White goes on the attack with 26 and 28.

Black 31. Black 'c' would be usual, but Black is hoping for White 'd'—Black 'c'.


White 34. White is hoping for Black 'e'—White 40.

Black 35. Black does not want to answer passively at 'e' and he cannot counterattack by cutting with 1 and 3 in Dia. 3.


Dia. 3. The continuation after the cut is forced. When White connects at 12, Black has to play 13 to forestall a ladder, but White captures his key stones with 14.

White 40 etc. Cho had doubts later about his play here, for his attack does not gain him points, while his group at the bottom is weakened. Instead of 40, defending patiently with White 'f' would have been better.

Black 47 is an excellent move, combining attack and defence. White has to reinforce at 48 (even then Black 'g' remains a threat), so Black gets sente to switch to the right with 49.



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

Figure 3 (51 - 103)

White 52 fails to be a forcing move. White should instead force with 1 and 3 in Dia. 4, then block with 5. When Black moves through the middle of White's position with 53 and 59, he has recovered from his earlier setback.

White 54, 60. White is reluctant to play ajikeshi moves like these, but he has no choice if he wants to get sente to extend at 62. The latter move is important, as it defends against the threat of Black 'a'.




Figure 3 (51 - 103)


Black 69. Otake commented that he should have exchanged Black 74 for White 'b' first, as White 70 gives White excellent thickness.

White 70. If at 71, Black will play Black 70, White 'c', Black 'd'. White 'c' at 'e' would be unreasonable because of Black 'c'.


Black 79. If at 'f', White intends to defend the right side with 'g', which would finish off the game. Black therefore has to counterattack, even though this lets White settle his group inside Black's moyo.

Black 87. Cho commented that he would have found the attack at 1 in Dia. 5 more disagreeable. One possible variation is the sequence to 10 here. Since White can aim at 'a', this result is not unacceptable for him, but it does seem better for Black than the result in the game, as 92 and 94 give White a definite lead.

Perhaps because he relaxed after securing this group, Cho immediately played a bad move with 96. Best here is simply jumping to 1 in Dia. 6.



Dia. 5



Dia. 6

Dia. 6. If Black 2, White 3 and 5 leave White with a connection at 'a'. If Black 2 at 'b', then after White 'c' and Black 'd', White 5 would be just right.

Cho played 96 so that he could push through with 98 to 102, but these moves unfortunately eliminate the option of White 'h'.





Figure 4 (104 - 150)

Figure 4 (104 - 150)

White 4. White should first exchange 'a' for Black 'b', as later 'a' may not be sente.

Black 7, 9. Bad moves which just make White thick. Otake was suffering from some kind of hallucination here.

White 16. Now it is White's turn to make a bad move. White should simply defend at 'c', as 16 gives Black the chance to play the tesuji of 17. If White resisted with 1 etc. in Dia. 7, his large group would be doomed after Black 6 and 8. As it is, White just barely manages to save both his groups, at the cost of having his right side position depressed and letting Black build thickness by capturing three stones. Even so, White still keeps a little ahead, as he keeps sente to play 48. However, Cho was already in byo-yomi.



Dia. 7





Figure 5 (151 - 200)



Dia. 8

Figure 5 (151 - 200)


White 60. Not at 'a', as Black would kill him with 'b', White 'c', Black 'd'.

White 70. Another misstep. White would have had a definite win if he had reinforced the eye-shape of his group at the top with 1 in Dia. 8.

Dia. 8. If White 1, the continuation to 5 is probable. White may have disliked the prospect of Black 2, which aims at a ko with 'a', but even if White loses it, the ko is small. For various reasons, which become clear in the game, securing the group at the top takes priority.

Black 73 exploits the weakness of White's group: White is unable to resist. Even after defending up to 80, the group is still vulnerable.

White 88 is another mistake. Actually, Cho went into byo-yomi on move 18 in the previous figure, which explains the problems he is having



Dia. 9

in the endgame. Instead of 88, White should jump in at 1 in Dia. 9. White keeps sente, so he can switch to 7, a result which would give him a slight but definite lead.

White 100. Connecting in gote at 95 is out of the question. All the same, White 'e' is bigger than 100. Cho mistakenly thought that Black would be able to gain points by cutting at 'f', but if he did cut, White could then play 100.




Figure 6 (201 - 241)

Figure 6 (201 - 241)

White 14 is also bad. Correct is White 20, Black 21, White 25.

White 22 should also be at 25. White planned to continue with White 34, Black 32, White 33, Black 31, White 'a', but he realised after playing 22 that Black would answer White 34 by starting



Otake evens the Gosei series through superior endgame play in the second game.

a ko with Black 30. White does not have enough threats to win a ko.

White 22 was the losing move, for White cannot win once Black plays 25.

Figure 7 (242 – 283)

White 44. If at 69, White would only lose by half a point.

Cho's loss in this game could safely be blamed on time trouble. In the endgame he made a series of small mistakes, losing a point here, half a point there, inevitably resulting in a reversal of his lead. This somewhat lucky win for Otake turned the tide of the title match.

Black wins by 1½ points.




Figure 7 (242 – 283)

Game Three

White: Otake Hideo

Black: Cho Chikun

date: 13th August, 1980; played at the Nihon Ki-in

Figure 1 (1 – 21)

Black 1, 3, 5. A sixth sense told Otake that Cho was going to play sanren-sei.

Black 17 is a resolute move, because the bottom area does not seem to be important in this fuseki. Black 17 indirectly reduces the effectiveness of a hane by White at 'a', but more conventional would be splitting the left side immediately




Figure 1 (1 – 21)

with 21, a move which Cho considered. He also gave 'b', 'c' and 'd' as alternatives to 17.

Black 21. Black's strategy is to lay equal stress on moyo and on territory. Depending on the flow of the game, he is ready to go either way.





Figure 2 (22 - 61)

Figure 2 (22 - 61)

White 30. If White tried to seal Black in with 1 etc. in Dia. 1, he would end in gote, thus letting Black take the large point of 10. White would fall behind in territory.

Black 31. A noteworthy move: Cho does not attack impetuously with Black 32, a move most players would make automatically, Black 31 is typical of Cho's indirect approach.

Black 35. Another interesting move. More usual would be jumping to Black 36, but then




Dia. 1

White could play 35 or 'a'. Cho's reasoning presumably is that White's cap at 36 only makes Black 31 look good. Incidentally, when Takemiya saw Black 35, he commented that Cho must be 'either a genius or a madman', but Kato, who was also following the game, defended Cho's strategy. In fact, Black 35 does give Black a reasonable game.

White 44. Since Black has settled himself at the top, White wants to do the same, in part to alleviate the threat of Black 'b'.

After the game, someone asked Otake what he thought of White 44 at 1 in Dia. 2, but Otake retorted that that really would be crazy. For a start, White would lose his possible attack at 'a', gouging out Black's base. Black would block at 'b' after White 9 and once again the ▲ stone would look good, nipping White's influence in the bud. The closer one looks at Black 31, the more one realises what a good move it is.




Dia. 2


Black 49 is cautious. However, Otake felt that rapping Black at 50 made a close game of it. He could not understand why Cho did not extend at 1 in Dia. 3. Black 1 would give Black good follow-up moves at 'a' and 'b' and also make a difference to Black's right side territory. Nonetheless, Cho was satisfied with 49.

Black 53. Capping at 55 is also possible, but 53 gives Black more thickness.


White 58 was considered dubious by most players following the game, as White is forced to link up on the second line. Otake admitted that he



Dia. 3



Dia. 4



Dia. 5

Dia. 6

Dia. 7

should have made the diagonal connection at 1 in Dia. 4.

Dia. 4. If Black 2 and 4, White connects with 5, after which Black would play 'c' in the figure. White elevates his position to the third line. Incidentally, instead of Black 2 —

Dia. 5. Black would have to resist the temptation to block at 2, as White has a severe counter-attack with 3. The continuation to 9 makes miai of 10 and 11, neither of which would make Black happy.

Black 59 is properly cautious. If Black played immediately at 61, that is, at 1 in Dia. 6, White might well counter with 2 to 6. In the figure, the Black 'a'—White 'b' exchange in this diagram has been added, which makes enough of a difference for this approach to be bad for White.

Figure 3 (62 — 90)

Black 65 is a good point, but White's answer at 66 is not so much leisurely as leaden-footed. Black gets an excellent move at 67, destroying White's base and squeezing him out into the centre. White should have played 66 at 1 in Dia. 7.





Figure 3 (62 — 90)




Dia. 8

Black would still have the aji of 'a' and 'b', but he would not be able to take away all of White's base.


Black 65 and 67 set up a nice attack for Black, ably continued by 71 and 73. It is becoming clear that Black has taken a lead. The only worrying point was that with 67 Cho went into the last hour of his time allowance. Time trouble is always a greater threat to Cho than any of his mortal opponents, though with his characteristic forthrightness he has declared that if he's silly enough to make mistakes in byo-yomi, he doesn't deserve to win anyway.

Black 81. Cho missed an ideal chance to settle the game here by playing 1 in Dia. 8. White would have to defend at 2, so Black could then attack with 3, forcing White to live in gote up to 12. This would give Black superb thickness in the centre. If White tried to live with 'a' instead of 4, Black would still get central thickness. Either way, this thickness would be enough to give Black a win. Note that instead of White 2 —

Dia. 9. White might like to link up with 2, but that would give Black a severe attack at 3. When he slides into the corner with 9, Black wins the fight with 'me ari, me nashi' (he has an eye but White does not). Of course, if White wants to



Dia. 9



Dia. 10

save his stones, then instead of 4 —

Dia. 10. He could compromise with 4 here, peaceably letting Black link up, but Black 9 is sente. This territorial loss is unacceptable.

Cho was apparently reluctant to play 1 in *Dia. 8* because it links up two living groups, but Otake commented that he likes this kind of move. Undeniably Cho missed a good opportunity here.




Figure 4 (91 - 114)

style of the two players.


Otake was very relieved at getting the chance to hane at 94, for he felt that capturing the black stone up to 104 made the game close.


Black 95 is necessary. Cutting with 1 in *Dia. 12* is unreasonable, as White counters with 2 to 6. Black 5 at 'a' is refuted by White 5.

Black 105. Black cannot permit White 105 or 107.

Black 109. Cho commented that perhaps he should just have pulled back at 'a'.

White 114 is a tesuji. Otake thought that Cho might dodge a fight by answering peacefully with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 13*, but Cho chose to meet him head-on.





Dia. 14


decisive battle of the game.

Black 35. Should be at 53. After the game Cho bitterly regretted making such a 'weak-looking move'. White 36 gives White a lot of useful aji here, but even so it is not clear how much better Black 53 would have been.


Dia. 14. If Black plays solidly at 1, White would peep at 2, then link up with 4. Black probably would not be happy with this result either.

Incidentally, Cho went into byo-yomi on 35.

Black 37 is a good move. White has to answer at 38, so Black has the option of pulling back at 47 later or squeezing White with the sequence in *Dia. 15*, whichever fits the position at the time.



Dia. 15




Dia. 16


Black 39 is an aggressive cut, but Cho is not actually trying to capture White's centre group.

White 46. Apparently turning at 1 in *Dia. 16* is correct here. Black must defend at 2 to prevent White from playing there, so an exchange would follow. This result would give a very close game.

Black 55. The climax of the game. Cho was considering the hanes in *Dias. 17* and *18*, either of which would have been satisfactory for Black. However, he was down to his last two minutes of byo-yomi (the allowance is five minutes, with a minute being deducted only when the player takes a full sixty seconds or more on his move). Under the pressure of making a snap decision, he unfor-



Dia. 17



Dia. 18

tunately chose to cut at 55. This was the losing move. When White connected up his centre group with 56 to 60, he went into the lead for the first time in this game.

To take a look at the correct moves for Black 55 –

Dia. 17. Black 1 is a strong move. White is able to link up with 2 to 8, but Black 'a' is sente, so Black will be able to cut at 'b' next. This is much better for Black than the result in the game.

Dia. 18. If Black 1 here, an exchange follows up to 10. This result would also give a close game. Note that if White plays 6 at 'a', Black gets a good result with Black 7, White 9, Black 8.

Black 57. Necessary to defend against the combination of White 'a' and 'b', which would capture Black's key stones.

Figure 6 (161 – 200)

Black 63. Black 66 is better.

White 64 is big and also sente.




Figure 6 (161 – 200)

Black 67 is not really necessary. Blocking at 97 or descending at 81 would be better. Little by little, White is increasing his lead.




Figure 7 (201 - 238)

Figure 7 (201 - 238)

When Cho finally resigned, the game was close on the board. This loss must have been even more painful for him than the second game.

Black resigns after White 238.

Game Four

White: Cho Chikun

Black: Otake Hideo

date: 27th August, 1980; played at the Nihon Ki-in

Figure 1 (1 - 49)

Black 9, 11. Playing Black 11 first is usual, as Black 9 gives White the chance to counterattack at 11 instead of 10.

White 18. Both Sakata and Kobayashi Koichi commented that the leisurely move of 'a' was preferable. The sequence to 30 is forced, but it gives Black too much corner territory.

Black 29 is the honte (proper move). If Black plays at 1 in Dia. 1, White will just squeeze with 2 and 4, then set up another squeeze with 6 to 12.

White 30. Necessary to prevent Black 'b'.

Black 31. A belated sanren-sei, matching Cho's sanren-sei in the third game.

White 36. Otake suggested that playing on top, at 1 in Dia. 2, would have been better. If Black 4, White forces with 5, then extends at 7.

White 40. The crucial move of the game. Cho







Figure 1 (1 - 49)



Dia. 1 5: connects



Dia. 2




Dia. 3

seems to be in too much of a hurry. Although he has no trouble living up to 48, it is questionable whether he gains from this result, since Black's territory here was open at the side (at 34) to begin with. In view of that, the invasion is not urgent. Instead of 40 —


Dia. 3. Playing out at 1 is the only move. If Black 2, White 3 gives a leisurely game. White can enter Black's moyo later on, while capturing the ▲ stones is quite large.

Black 41. Black does not block at 1 in *Dia. 4*, as in this position the side and the centre are more important than the corner. If Black 1, the sequence to 6 would follow, which would be satisfactory for White. Black's territory at the top is still open at the top.

Black 49 is a superb point. This makes the game easy for Black.



Dia. 4



Dia. 5





Figure 2 (50 – 69)

Figure 2 (50 – 69)

Black 51. Kajiware would probably attack at 'a'.

White 54. Not at 'b', as his position is already low on the left.

Incidentally, Black's defect at 'c' is worrying, but it does not seem worthwhile for White to cut there just now. White 1 in *Dia. 5* is possible, as the ladder is favourable, but when Black counters with 2 to 6, White's prospects in the fight are far from clear. His three stones could easily end



Dia. 6

up as just a burden.


White 56. White 65 would be better, but Cho must have felt that it was too submissive.

Black 61, 63. Very leisurely responses to White's attempt to erase his moyo. Perhaps Otake feels that he's ahead. Sakata's comment: 'When I saw Black 61, I was impressed with Otake's skilfulness at regulating the flow of the game. Unfortunately, one can't demonstrate this in diagrams, but this move comes from an intuitive grasp of various factors — the possibility of a yose-ko (approach move ko) in the corner, building up his moyo, preparing for an attack on White, and on top of all this, an assessment of the overall position. Black 61 takes into account all these factors.'

White 64 is dubious, as the exchange for 65 puts Black ahead in territory. White cannot push up at the vital point of 'd' next, because that would only provoke Black 'e'. Instead of 64, Sakata, Takemiya and Kobayashi agreed that White should peep at 1 in *Dia. 6*, then go for territory with 3, thus staking the game on his ability to rescue the white group above.

White 66 is a big move: White is defying Black to attack in the centre, for if he took the time to defend there, he would never catch up in territory. However, Black 67 is such a severe attack Cho had second thoughts about 66, commenting that perhaps after all he should have followed *Dia. 6*.

White 68. The losing move, according to Koba-



Dia. 7

yashi, as it gives Black a perfect attack at 69. He advocated trying to live with 'f' or instead playing 1 in Dia. 7. If Black 2, White 3; answering 4 at 'a' would let Black continue his attack, so White would counterattack with 5 and 7, leading to a difficult fight. If Black 'b', then White 'c'; Black might give atari at 'c' instead, but White would get useful thickness with 'd'.




Figure 3 (69 - 100)

Figure 3 (69 - 100)

Black 69. Note that Black does not push at 1 in Dia. 8 first. White would attach at 2, then answer 3 differently from the game, with 4 to 8. The exchange of 1 for 2 would now be a big minus for Black, for with this result at the bottom, he would prefer to attack at 'a' instead of 1.

White 72. If simply at 74, Black will pull back at 72, improving on Dia. 8 because the 1-2 exchange has not been made.


White 76 is very stubborn. Simply attaching at 100 seems preferable.

Black 79. The vital point: White is in real trouble.


White 82. After the game the possibility of White 1 in Dia. 9 was discussed. White answers 2 at 3, thus staking the game on the fate of his centre group. Cho: 'It looks like being captured.' Otake: 'No, it's not easy to attack it.'

White 84. A difficult point: White 'a' would be stronger in relation to the bottom, but 84 is stronger in relation to the centre.

Black 87. Black intends to settle the game, sacrificing these three stones as preparation for



Dia. 8



Dia. 9

attaching at 91. The continuation to 97 is forced. Black gets an enormous territory on the right, at the cost of isolating his stones on the left. If White could capture these, he would win, but that would be too much to expect.

Figure 4 (101 - 133)

White 2. If at 1 in Dia. 10, Black lives easily





Figure 4 (101 - 133)




Dia. 10


with 2 to 6 (6 could also be at 'a'). White 3 at 4 would be unreasonable because of Black 'b'.

Black 7 is the vital point: White has no effective counter. If White 8 at 9, Black plays in at 8 and looks like getting eyes.

Black 9. Black could just block at 1 in Dia. 11, according to Kobayashi. Black wins the fight after 19. However, Otake compromised, taking three stones up to 17 in the figure.



Dia. 11




Dia. 12

quence in Dia. 12, but a seki is not enough, so White plays for all or nothing. All the same, he cannot hope to win a ko, for Black has unlimited ko threats on the bottom left.

White 50. White could win the fight with the sequence in Dia. 13, but with Black getting so many ko threats, it would make no difference, for the top right corner group would be doomed. White chooses to go out fighting.

White resigns after Black 167.



Dia. 13




Figure 4 (134 – 167)

ko: 45, 48, 51, 56

Figure 5 (134 – 167)

White 36. White could get a seki with the se-




Otake wins his third title, thus taking a lead over Kato in the title stakes. However, he has no time to rest on his laurels, for almost immediately he has to meet Cho's challenge in the Meijin title match.

Profile of a Prodigy




Cho Chikun can safely be called the greatest go prodigy of the post-war era. Ever since he came to Japan at the age of six, he has been breaking records — youngest player to become a professional, youngest player to win an open title, etc. At twenty-four, he is only the third youngest player to become Meijin (Ishida and Rin both beat him by a year), but this is already his eighth title, so there is no knowing how many he will end up with. A brief outline of his career will indicate how much he has already accomplished.



(1 ~ 118) 36: connects

Cho (5 stones) v. Rin Kaiho 6-dan, played at the party celebrating the 100-dan total of the Kitani school, 2nd August, 1962. White resigns after Black 118.



11th Pro Best Ten, playoff for 10th place

Cho Chikun (black) v. Fujisawa Shuko

9th May, 1974. White resigns after Black 115.

1956: born on the 23rd July in Seoul; nephew of Cho Nan-tetsu (Cho Nam-choul) 8-dan

1962: came to Japan to enter the Kitani school; the day after his arrival he beat Rin Kaiho on five stones (the game is given below)

1968: shodan at the age of eleven; promoted to 2-dan the same year (1969: 3-dan; 1970: 4-dan; 1971: 5-dan; 1973: 6-dan; 1975: 7-dan; 1978: 9-dan)

1972: 8th in Pro Best Ten

1973: won the New Stars tournament (TV haya-go)

1974: Nihon Ki-in Championship challenger, lost 2-3 to Sakata; won New Stars

1975: won 12th Pro Best Ten, defeating Kato 3-0

1976: won Asahi Top Eight tournament, the 24th Oza title and the New Stars

1978: won 4th Gosei title, beating Otake 3-0

Played in 1976-79 Meijin leagues and the 1980-1981 Honinbo leagues

Perhaps the main characteristic of Cho's go is his tenacity. Before the Meijin title match began, Ishida Yoshio commented that of contemporary players, 'Otake is the quickest to win, but Cho is the slowest to lose.' This turned out to be an apt description of the series.

5th Meijin Title

Game One

White: Cho Chikun 8-dan

Black: Otake Meijin, Judan & Gosei

komi: 5½; time: 9 hours each

date: 10th, 11th September, 1980

played at Hanezawa Gardens in Tokyo





Figure 1 (1 - 36)

Figure 1 (1 - 36). An empty corner


Black 9. Otake's intuition told him that if he made the usual move at 'a', White would switch to 'b' in the bottom left corner. If Black peeps at 9 after having played 'a', White will not connect (the extra black stone makes the white stones light), while if Black makes a pincer at 'c', White is untroubled, as these three stones have quite a resilient shape.

White 10. If White connects at 13 Black will continue with 'd'. White would then be heavy, so a pincer at 'c' would be severe. Pushing up at 10 is thus the only move.

White 12. At first Cho intended to follow the joseki White 15-Black 12, then switch to the empty corner. His decision to play 12 led to a pattern which may be familiar to our readers, for it appeared in the first game of last year's Gosei title match (see GW16, p. 5). The sequence to 18 is the same, but in that game, Otake, who had black, played 3 and 5 in Dia. 1 instead of cutting at 19. This whole pattern is an 'unfinished joseki', still in the workshop.



Dia. 1



Dia. 2


10: connects

The cut at 19 is actually fairly unusual, but it did appear in another game just before this. Kobayashi Koichi played it against Hane in the final round of the Meijin league. Hane answered with the combination of 1 and 3 in Dia. 2. In the continuation to 18, White gets a nice squeeze, but Black gets thickness. Kato Masao's opinion was that this result was favourable for Black.


White 28. Perhaps just a little unreasonable. The usual move would be jumping to 'e', but White does not want to permit Black to play at 28. The sequence White 'e'-Black 28-White 'f'-Black 'g' would see White just playing on dame points.

Black 29. A good answer, made instantaneously by Otake. If White now plays 'e', he will be in for a hard fight when Black attaches at 'h'.

Black 33. Otake regretted the exchange for 34. If instead Black plays at 1 in Dia. 3, White must play 2 (to prevent a hanekomi to the right of 2), so Black could block at 3. If White 4, Black plays 5 and aims at starting a fight with Black 'a',



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

9: connects

White 'b', Black 'c'. Cho said that he would first squeeze with 4 to 8 in Dia. 4 before jumping to 10, but he agreed that the fight started by 11 would be tough for White.




Figure 2 (37 – 59)

Figure 2 (37 – 59). *Mistake in direction*

Black 37. Black cannot cut with 1 and 3 in Dia. 5. Thanks to the aji of the squeeze, White has the tesuji of 8, enabling him to capture the cutting stones with 16.


Black 41. Black cannot give atari at 1 in Dia. 6, as he would lose his four pivotal stones. Black 41 is a tesuji to cut indirectly. White has to defend at 42, so Black can cut off the centre stones with 43.

Black 43. Black should first peep at 'a'. If White 'b', this would help Black if he hanes at 'c' later on. Black is afraid that White will ignore 'a', switching to the empty corner, but since Black ends in gote here anyway, he might as well play 'a'.


White 44 is a mistake in direction. The fight in this area has just finished, so there is no reason to keep playing here. Instead, White should take the empty corner with White 45; if next Black 46, then White 'd', while if Black played at 'e', extending at 'f' would be good enough.

Black 45. Back to the fuseki. It's very unusual in modern go for a corner to remain unattended to for so long.

Black 49. Otake regretted this move, since 50 was a good move for White. Black should have played 49 at 'g'; if White jumps to 'h', Black



Dia. 5




Dia. 6

could then secure the corner with 'i'.


Black 51. The sealed move. Otake spent more time on this one move (102 minutes) than he had so far taken in the day's play (98 minutes, to Cho's 4 hours 25 minutes for the day). However, there were few professionals who approved of his choice. Cho had expected Black 53, while other predictions were 'h' (Takemiya) and 'j' (Kajiwara).

Black 55. An interesting answer to 54: Black is striving for maximum efficiency, aiming at the attachment at 'k'. However, 55 backfires, for it gives White a chance to take the initiative with 56 and 58. With the benefit of hindsight, it seems clear that Black should simply have played 55 at 58.

Black 59. Black cannot play 'l' for the same reason that he did not want to play 58: it is too inefficient. He attaches at 59 in the hope that he can get some help in settling his group. For example, the sequence in Dia. 7, giving him sente to attack at 6, would be ideal.



Dia. 7



Dia. 8

Figure 3 (60 – 100). *An even game*

White 60, 62. White of course does not obey orders. Otake plunged into thought again. After sixty-four minutes he switched to 63, an indication




Figure 3 (60 - 100)

that his contact play in the corner has failed, for he has no good continuation after White 62. He could live in the corner if he wanted to, but that would weaken his centre group too much.

A tewari analysis of the corner shows what a loss Black has suffered. If White were to defend the corner, he would probably play at 1 in Dia. 8. For Black to 'attack' the corner with 2 and 4 would be hard to justify, but this is equivalent to the result in the figure. If Black did nothing, he would have the aji of an invasion at 'a'; if White 3 he could attach at 5.


Black 71. Without this reinforcement, the threat of White 'a' is disturbing.

White 74. The position is now dead even. Black had held the initiative throughout the early stages, but White 58 in Figure 2 changed the flow of the game.


White 74—Black 75. This exchange has a meaning. White would not be able to win with the ordinary sequence of White 76—Black 74—White 'b'. The virtue of White 74 is that if Black hanes at 1 in Dia. 9 with 77, White not only lives with 2 to 10 but also kills the black group. That is why Black plays 77 and 79.

White 80. Sente, as it threatens White 'c'. Black 83—White 'd'; if then Black 81, White would answer at 'e'. Black has to defend with 81—83.


Incidentally, if the Black 'f'—White 'g' exchange had been made (i.e. before Black 43 in Figure 2), then Black 81—83 would be sente, threatening to capture White with the sequence in Dia. 10.




Dia. 9



Dia. 10



Dia. 11



Dia. 12

White 86. If at 87, Black would cut at 88. White might be able to capture the corner stones, but if Black became thick on the outside, White's centre group would be placed in jeopardy.

White 92. The strongest move. Cho is staking the game on this move, for it gives Black carte blanche in the centre. The usual move would be White 'b', but that would let Black play the enormous endgame sequence in Dia. 11.

Dia. 11. Black takes endgame profit in sente with 1 to 7, for White 8 is necessary to prevent Black from starting a ko with 'a'. Black could also capture a stone by playing 7 at 'b' and this would lessen the effectiveness of escaping with the white stones in the centre. The difference between this result and White 92—96 in the figure is fifteen points, but since it would be sente for Black (92 is 'reverse sente' for White), the real value for counting purposes is thirty points.

Black 93. A difficult decision. Black could launch an attack with 1 in Dia. 12, but White would respond by taking profit with 2 and 4. Black would have to capture the centre group to make up for this, but White should be able to pick up two eyes. Prudence, with 93, seems the better part of valour.





Figure 4 (101 - 154)




Dia. 13

Figure 4 (101 - 154). The losing move

Black 11 is the losing move: White will not answer this peep once he has strengthened his group in the centre with 2 to 10. Actually, Black's real mistake here came with the timing of Black 1. Instead of 1 -

Dia. 13. This is the right time to peep at 1. Since his centre group is still weak, White has little choice but to connect at 2, after which Black can turn at 3. White will reinforce with 4 to 8, whereupon Black can hane at 9, then switch to 11. This would make the game extremely close, but Black would be just a little in front.

If Black 1 missed a chance to secure a win, Black 11 was the move which made the game decisively lost. Black has no chance once White descends at 12, so he should have played there himself instead of 11. White would have to defend at



Dia. 14

20, so Black could then play 11. This would still give an extremely close game, with the difference now that Black would be a fraction behind. At least he would still have a chance, but peeping at 11 in the figure put him out of the running.

White 18. Cho went into byo-yomi, but fortunately for him the main problems of the game had been resolved.

Black 23, 25. Played to save face for 11, but actually Black 1 in Dia. 14 would be bigger. White would settle the centre with 2 to 6 (and still win), but Black 1 would give Black the continuation shown in the corner. White will not play 8 at 11, as Black 10 would set up a good move at 'a'. The difference between playing this sequence and permitting White 26 in the figure is about fifteen points.

White 40. White does not expect to live in the corner, but he wants to make his connection at 50 sente. White 46 forces Black 47, so when White plays 50, Black has to answer at 51. White thus gets sente to capture at 52.

Figure 5 (155 - 212). First blood to Cho

White 56. The last large point.

When Black resigns, he is about one point ahead on the board.

Otake made a good start in this game, but his mistake in strategy with 55 in Figure 2 changed the flow of the game. Cho was able to seize the initiative by counterattacking with 58 and under pressure Otake made an even more dubious move in the top left corner. That made the game even, but Otake's later strategy was also mistaken and he gradually fell behind. In retrospect, trying




Figure 5 (155 - 212)
85: connects

to win on territory with 93 in Figure 3 seems to have been the wrong decision, although the actual losing move came later. Making a strong attack on White's centre group would have been more in keeping with Otake's usual style.

Black resigns after White 212.

Time taken. White: 8 hours 59 minutes

Black: 8 hours 22 minutes.

(Based on commentaries by Cho Chikun)

Special Game Commentary

Meijin Title, Game Two

White: Otake Hideo

Black: Cho Chikun

date: 17th, 18th September

played in Takarazuka City, Hyogo prefecture

Commentary by Cho Chikun

Figure 1 (1 - 30). A peaceful start

Black 11 - 15. The same pattern as in the upper right. This peaceful start is quite a contrast to the first game. While that game ended quite peacefully, however, this game comes to a violent climax.

Black 25. Black 'a'—White 'b'—Black 25 would give Black ideal shape, but instead of playing like this, White would counter with 2 in Dia. 1.

Dia. 1. Black would still be satisfied if White played this joseki, as 7 is a good hane. Even if White cuts at 'a', he cannot capture 7 in a ladder, so Black could face this fight with confidence.







Figure 1 (1 - 30)




Dia. 1



Dia. 2



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

Instead of 4 -

Dia. 2. White will block at 1. Black 2 is necessary, but 3 works well with White's position at the bottom.

Black 27. If at 'c', White will attack at 'd'.

White 28. If at 30, then Black 'e'.

Black 29. Cho commented that perhaps it would have been better to force with 1 and 3 in Dia. 3, then extend at 5. Instead of 2 -

Dia. 4. If White hanes on top at 2, then Black

3 (or 'a') gives Black a peep at 5.

White 30 is an excellent point. The 23–30 exchange is bad for Black, but then the 28–29 exchange is not good for White, so perhaps the result is even.






Figure 2 (31 – 60)



Dia. 5



Dia. 6


Figure 2 (31 – 60). *A moyo contest?*

Black 31. Black decides to make the game a moyo contest. Instead of 31, he could also reduce White's moyo with 1 to 5 in Dia. 5.


Black 35. Takemiya, the large moyo specialist, commented that Black should play 1 in Dia. 6. If White 2, Black can lightly discard his stone there and continue with 3.

Black 37. Cho had his doubts about this move later. Fujisawa Hosai, who sat in when Cho gave this commentary, suggested Black 1 and 3 in Dia. 7. White must capture at 4, so Black would get sente to expand his moyo at the bottom by peeping at 'a' in the figure.

White 38 is the key point at the bottom. That Cho was not happy with his position was clear from the fact that he spent sixty-five minutes on



Dia. 7



Dia. 8


his answer, his slowest move of the game. In the end, he decided to persist with his large moyo at the bottom.

Cho: 'I have no idea what is the best move for 39. I played 39 because I couldn't find anything better – a white move at 'b' would be troublesome – but I did not feel that it was a good move. It leaves bad aji and it's small anyway. Perhaps I should have followed Dia. 8. Black 1 to 5 are sente, so Black could next reduce the moyo at the top with 7 (or 'a' or 'b').'

Black 45. A leisurely move which complements Black 39. Black is aiming at invading at 'c' later.

White 46. The sealed move. Otake spent one hour thirty-five minutes on it, incidentally drawing exactly even with Cho in time consumption – three hours fifty minutes each – for the day.

White 48. Cho: 'I expected White 1 and 3 in Dia. 9, after which I intended to reduce White's



Dia. 9

moyo with 4. However, if White boldly invaded at 5, I would be in trouble.' White 48 shows that Otake was confident that he could match moyo for moyo.

Black 49, 51. Simply expanding his moyo with 59 is not enough to win. Black hopes to complete his moyo in the process of attacking White's group. With 57 and 59 he succeeds in this aim.




Figure 3 (61 - 70)

Figure 3 (61 - 70). The turning point


White 62. White could no longer hope to get away with an invasion at the bottom, so he does not mind letting Black strengthen himself with 63 etc. It is important for him to play 62 before Black plays 'a'.

Black 63. Not at 1 in Dia. 10 because of White 2 and 4.

If White 66 follows the proverb, 'cut across the knight's move' (see 'Basic Fighting Techniques' in this issue), then Black 67 follows the complementary proverb, 'don't cut the tsuke-koshi'. Dia.11 shows why: if Black 1, White gets eye-shape in sente.


White 70. The move which changed the flow of the game, from a peaceful moyo contest into a furious life and death struggle. Since this is the turning point of the game, it's worth getting some other opinions.

Ishida Yoshio: 'Forcing with 1 and 3, then surrounding with 5 in Dia. 12 would be good enough. By my calculations, Black would not be able to give the komi.' Note that the sequence White 'a'—Black 'b'—White 'c'—Black 'd' at the bottom is




Dia. 10

Dia. 11



Dia. 12




Dia. 13

White's privilege.

Fujisawa Hosai: 'Black won't make it so easy for White. He would probably ignore White 3, switching to 4 in Dia. 13.'

Cho: 'If Black simply connects in answer to White 70, White would probably force with 1 and 3 in Dia. 12, then defend at 5 or play 'b' at the top right in the figure. That would be unbearable for Black. My own schedule called for White to surround at 1 in Dia. 14 (next page), whereupon I intended to force with 2 to 8. The difference would be enormous.'



Dia. 14

The conclusion seems to be that White 70 was an overplay which gave Black a chance to counter-attack and thus complicate the game. Since White had the edge in territory, he should have played more conservatively. For example, Fujisawa Hosai suggested the straightforward sequence White 'c'—Black 'd'—White 'e'.





Figure 4 (71 – 90)

Figure 4 (71 – 90). Black's challenge


White 74 is the strongest answer to Black's attack with 71 and 73. White cannot compromise with 1 in Dia. 15, as just pulling back with 2 would give Black a favourable result. Black would also have the aji of 'a' or 'b' to aim at.

Black 75. Apparently the sequence to 5 in Dia. 16 is not good enough. The ponnuki strengthens White and makes Black thin. For example, White could aim at cutting at 'a'.


White 76. The only move. If White connects at 1 in Dia. 17, Black cuts at 2; if then White 'a', Black has 'b' for later, which is a big loss for White. However —




Dia. 15




Dia. 16




Dia. 17




Dia. 18



Dia. 19



Dia. 20



Dia. 21

Dia. 18. If White 1, Black counters with 2 and 4. If White tries to kill him with 5, Black should be able to live with 6 to 10. Black could play 'a', aiming at a ko at 'b'.

Dia. 19. If White blocks on the outside at 1, Black exchanges 4 for 5, then extends at 8.

Dia. 20. If White 9, then after 10 to 16 —

Dia. 21. Black lives with 18 and 20. He might even try to live in sente, with 20 at 'a'.



Cho looks preoccupied as he leaves the playing room for dinner on the second day. He has staked the game on his invasion of White's territory at the top.

White 80. Again the strongest resistance — White refuses to compromise.


Black 81. Black seems to be switching back and forth at random, but, as revealed soon enough, there is a profound connection between all his moves at the top.

White 84. This move is essential, but Otake spent one hour thirty-five minutes on it, as long as on the sealed move. Presumably he was thinking about White 90.

Black 89 is the only move. Black 1 in Dia. 22 (next page) looks possible, but after Black 5, White has a good move at 6. Next—



Otake looks exhausted. He has to find an effective counter to Cho's contact play at 81. His next move (White 84) is essential, but it is impossible to guess how the subsequent fighting will turn out.



Dia. 22

Dia. 23


Dia. 23. If Black 1 and 3, Black collapses after White 4 and 6.

White 90. Otake took no time on this move, which showed that he had worked it out earlier.

Cho: 'This move took me by surprise. It never occurred to me that Otake would make such a fierce attempt to capture me. I had expected Dia. 24.

Dia. 24. If White 1, Black plays 2 to 6. He cannot live after White blocks at 7, but he can cut with 8 and 10, enabling him to capture a stone up to 16. This would amount to a substantial reduction of White's territory.

Once White plays 90, the continuation is forced and the issue becomes very simple: if Black lives, he wins; if he dies — disaster. The whole top half of the board becomes a gigantic life and death problem.



Dia. 24

Figure 5 (91 – 116). *Staggering complexity*

The following commentary is presented more for entertainment than for edification. The game becomes so complicated that a definitive analysis is beyond the present level of professional skill. The main points to emerge from the post-game analysis are given, but the conclusions are necessarily tentative.

White 2. So far the moves have been forced, but this is the first turning point. Apparently White could also have simply jumped to 4, omitting 2.

Dia. 25. If White 1, the moves to 7 are forced (if White omits 7, Black gets a ko with Black 7, White 'a', Black 'b'). Black 8 and 10 are a strong continuation, but White 11 is the vital point.







Figure 5 (91 – 116)



Dia. 25



Dia. 26




Dia. 27 42: connects (left of 32)

Dia. 26. If Black 12 and 14, then White must play 15—he cannot cut at 20 because of Black 'a'. The continuation to 28 sets up a semeai.

Dia. 27. Black increases his liberties with 36 to 40, but White ends up one move ahead in the semeai. However —


Dia. 28. Fujisawa Hosai suggested that instead




Dia. 28

of 28 in Dia. 26, Black should have at 28 here, thus getting a ko.

Black 5. Cutting at 1 in Dia. 29 does not work as White wins with 6 and 8. Exchanging Black 8 for White 'a' before cutting would not help, as White would be able to crawl at 'b'.



Dia. 29




Dia. 30


Black 9 forces White to defend against the cut shown in Dia. 29.

Black 13 is the only move. If Black 1 in Dia. 30, White would counter with 2 to 8 and would have enough liberties to win the semeai.


White 14. If at 1 in Dia. 31, White would fall behind in the fight. Black 2 would be sente, so Black would then cut with 4 and 6 and be ahead in liberties. Instead of 1 —



Dia. 31



Dia. 32




Dia. 33

Dia. 32. White 1 is no good either. Black would counter with 2 and 4, then —

Dia. 33. Live with 6 to 14.

Black 15 could have been the losing move. The reason will become clear later, but for the moment suffice it to say that the correct move is Black 1 in Dia. 34. White would be able to capture the stones on the right with 2 and 4, but Black would be able to save half of his group with the sequence to 13. This is probably the best result that Black could get. However, White would continue by striking at the vital point with 14, thus making a large reduction in Black's territory, so the position would be favourable for him. Nonetheless, Black would still have a chance. The game would be decided by the fighting in the centre.



Dia. 34

The exchange for 16 is bad for Black because it loses him the aji of the contact tesuji of 13 in Dia. 34. This should have been fatal for Black, but luckily for him White gave him not one but two reprieves.





Figure 6 (117 – 135)

Figure 6 (117 – 135). *White throws the game away.*

White 20. The 'quasi-losing move'. White would have had a sure win if he had cut with 1 and 3 in Dia. 35. Since Black has lost the tesuji of 13 in Dia. 34, he finds looking after his group much tougher. If Black answers 13 by connecting, White plays 'a', killing him unconditionally. Black therefore has to block at 'a', letting White start a ko. Since White has already taken the stones on the right, this is almost a 'hanami ko' for him (i. e. Black has much more at stake). Since White could get unlimited ko threats by threatening to reduce Black's territory at the bottom, he would be guaranteed of winning.




Dia. 35


White 22 is the decisive mistake which makes the game hopeless for White. Instead of 22 –

Dia. 36. White must push through at 1. Black cannot answer at 2, as White 3 kills him, so –

Dia. 37. He must block at 2 here. White then captures the stones on the right with 3, but Black uses the combination of 4 and 6 to secure life up to 18. This result is clearly much worse for White



Dia. 36




Dia. 37

than Dia. 35, since most of his corner territory has been destroyed, but while he would be behind, he would still have an outside chance of winning. Following this diagram was his last chance of staying in the game.

Black 23 is the vital point: playing here in sente enables Black to save all of his stones.

White 28. Whatever White does, Black is able to play at 29 in sente. For example, if at 1 in Dia. 38, Black 4 forces White 5.




Dia. 38

The game is all over when Black gets an eye in sente up to 35. If White were to continue, he would have to defend at 1 in Dia. 39 (not at 'a'). If Black 2, White has to play the ko at 3 to stop him from getting a second eye, but actually this is no longer a ko. Black cuts with 4 to 10, then –

Dia. 40. If White pushes through at 11, Black captures him with 12 to 18.

Just for reference –

Dia. 41. If White blocks at 1 instead of defending in the corner, he gets into a terrible ko




Dia. 39

Dia. 40

with 2 to 6. This would be hopeless for White.

Both players made mistakes, so this game might not qualify as a masterpiece, but as far as excitement goes, with the fate of a large group hanging in the balance, it is perhaps the most



Dia. 41

spectacular title game since the fifth game of the 2nd Kisei title, when Fujisawa Shuko killed a large group of Kato's (see GW8). This time the group lived, so Cho picked up his second win in the series. There could not have been very many people who expected him to make such a good start in his first major title match.

White resigns after Black 135.

Time taken. White: 8 hours 43 minutes

Black: 8 hours 56 minutes

Strange Fusekis - Past and Present

Kuwahara's 1-3-5




Figure 1 (1 - 15)

White: Kada Katsuji 7-dan (now 9-dan)

Black: Kuwahara Munehisa 6-dan (now 7-dan)
played on the 12th October, 1960, in the Oteai

The term '1-3-5', referring to the opening moves, is most familiar in the phrase 'Shusaku's 1-3-5', a solid pattern for Black which became one of the foundations of modern fuseki. By coincidence Kuwahara has the same family name as Shusaku, but there the resemblance ends. His '1-3-5' is the rather startling formation shown in Figure 1. The whole emphasis of this pattern is




Figure 2 (16 - 101)

Moves after 101 omitted. Black wins by resignation.

on the side and since it surrenders the corner territory from the start, the premise is that there is no komi.

White 4. If at 5, Black intends to play 'a'; if then White 'b', Black 'c'.

Black 9. Black 10 would be inconsistent.

Black 15. Black 'd' would be thin.

Incidentally, Kada, a notoriously slow player, took four hours over his first three moves.

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
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
Good and Bad Style

Life and Death


Black to play




81: Black to live




82: Black to kill White



83: Black to kill White.




84: Black to kill White




85: Black to kill White


Vulgar Style




If Black plays 1 (or 'a'), he dies when White plays 2. Black 1 at 2 also fails when White plays 'a'.




If Black plays 1 and 3, White counters with 4, threatening to cut at 5. White 6 makes miai of 'a' and 'b'.



If Black hanes at 1, White has a good answer at 2. The result to 8 is a seki. If Black 3 at 4, White 3 gives a ko.




If Black 1, White gets a ko with 2.




If Black 1, White has a clever answer with 2 and 4. Black must defend against the threat of White 'a', so White has time to live with 'b'.


Correct Style




Dipping down to the first line with 1 is the only way to live.




If White 2, Black 3 and vice versa.




Making the hane first is the correct order of moves.




If White 2, Black then plays 3. Black 7 makes miai of 'a' and 'b'. Playing White 4 at 5 does not help.




Black 1 is the tesuji: Black now captures White unconditionally.




If White 3, Black now hanes at 3 and White has no answer.




Beginning with Black 1 is the key.



If White 2, Black 3 kills White. If White 'a', then Black 'b'.



Attacking from a little further off with 1 avoids any damezumari problems. White cannot live.




If White 2, Black 3 is enough.

The Great Joseki Debate

Honda Kunihisa 9-dan

How to choose a joseki in relation to the board as a whole is the theme of this debate. Three proposals are being made for White's next move: which one fits the opening best? Black has just played the ▲ stone.




Dia. A


A: White has no time to fool around, so he has to press at 1. That invites Black to push through and cut and, when he does, White gets to lay waste to the right side. The bottom is unimportant; the right side is where the action is.

B: I agree with what A says about the right side and the bottom, but I think it's too early to play the pressing move. Jumping out to 1 is just the move for this position.


C: I'm for the diagonal jump. I've always wanted to try this move at least once and this would be a golden opportunity.



Dia. B



Dia. C




Fuseki Diagram

Fuseki Analysis

As always, the adjacent sides and corners should guide the choice of joseki. Therefore, in this position it is necessary to look toward the upper right and lower left corners.

On the right Black has built thickness in the upper right corner and, trying to get the most use out of it, has made an extension to the triangularly marked stone in the fuseki diagram. His strategy here is to build up as large a moyo as possible; White's, in contrast, is to neutralize Black's thickness.

At the bottom the exchange of the circled white stone for the circled black stone has forced Black into a low position, with the result that this area no longer has much value. Had Black pushed up at the marked stone in the reference diagram, then the bottom would have immediately become valuable.




Reference Dia.

Choosing a joseki to fit the fuseki in the fuseki diagram must therefore meet two conditions: first, it must keep Black


from building a moyo on the right; second, it must treat the bottom as a light area, that is, as an area of no great importance.

B Wins the Debate

The move which meets these two conditions is




Dia. 1



Dia. 2

the one-space jump, so B wins the debate. A's thinking was correct, but it is unlikely that Black would follow orders so closely. As for C, the diagonal jump does not seem to fit this fuseki very well.


In answer to White's one-space jump in Dia. 1, the knight's move at 2 is usual. In this fuseki White should push with 3 and 5 in Dia. 2 to build up strength in order to invade at 7 or at 'a'. Forcing one's opponent along the fourth line is normally considered very bad, but in this case it becomes a rather good tactic since Black 4 and 6 are heading in a valueless direction.



Dia. 3

If Black jumps out to 8 in Dia. 3, then White pushes again at 9. Black is now unable to find a very effective attack against either the white stone above or the white group below. If he continues with the cap at 10, White nearly has a connection with the attachment and sagari of 11 and 13. If Black then peeps at 'a', White pushes through at 'b', after which it would be unreasonable for Black to try to cut as White would have no trouble settling his two groups. In short, after White 13 Black has no way to attack White.


If Black changes his approach and separates White with the strong move at 4 in Dia. 4, White




Dia. 4

can even jump out to 5 and it would be virtually impossible for Black to hold him in. Moreover, if Black plays carelessly thereafter, he could well find his own three stones under attack instead.

In place of 5 in Dia. 4, White can also simply play the diagonal hit at 1 in Dia. 5. After Black blocks the connection underneath, White turns at 5 and is already nearly alive. At the bottom, when Black plays 'a', White can strengthen himself by attaching and extending with 'b'—'c'—'d', a thick way of playing, while in the upper right corner, he has nothing to fear even though Black has dropped down to 4.




Dia. 5




Dia. 6

If Black plays the kosumi at 4 in Dia. 6 (previous page) instead of extending out at 5 after White has pushed at 1 and 3, White hanes at 5 as a matter of course. This follows the precept of playing hane at the head of two stones and White can hardly come out of the encounter badly. In one possible continuation to 13 White gains considerable territory in the corner and, later, might profit even more by making Black connect at 'a' after taking the ko. Strong in the corner, he need not hesitate about boldly invading the right side.




Dia. 7




Dia. 8

The two-space high pincer joseki, which is the focus of this issue's debate, is the most commonly played pincer and has a great range of variations. Although not exhausting the possible white replies, 'a' to 'j' in Dia. 7 are representative. From among these A, B and C chose 'd', 'f' and 'g'.

As previously mentioned, the knight's move at 2 is the usual reply to the one-space jump in Dia. 8. White then plays the attachment of 3 to give his stones a base in the corner. Pushing at 1 in Dia. 9 instead is very bad unless, as in Dia. 2, special circumstances call for it.




Dia. 9




Dia. 10

After 3 in Dia. 8 Black will hane at 4 in Dia. 10 and White will descend at 5. Black cannot switch 4 to 'a' as White will connect at 'b'. For White's part it would be a mistake to switch 5 to 1 in Dia. 11. While Black achieves an ideal shape up to 4 in that diagram, White's is unsatisfactory because the marked stone should




Dia. 11



Dia. 12


be at 'a'. From Dia. 10 the joseki comes to a pause after 8 in Dia. 12, although this move could be at either 'a' or 'b'.

If this joseki is superimposed on the fuseki diagram, White is able to get the excellent move at 9 in Dia. 13. Because his stones cannot be cut, White can invade the right side without risking any danger. This would be a perfect result for him.



Dia. 13

There are no doubt many who agreed with B and hypothesized Dia. 13 and are deserving of a good score, but instead of the narabi of 8, Black is more likely to fight back with the kosumi of 1 in Dia. 14. Usually White 2 is a strong attacking move, but in this case, assuming the continuation to 7, Black can fight well enough because of the triangularly marked stones to the left and the circled stones lying in wait at the top. If next White defends at 'a', Black attacks White 2 with 'b' or, if he wishes, can play the powerful sequence beginning with Black 'c'. Provided that




Dia. 14


the aji of White's pushing through and cutting at 'f' has been eliminated, Black can aim at the sequence Black 'g', White 'h', Black 'i'.

A's Proposal

In answer to the pressing move in Dia. 15, Black will push through and cut with 2 and 4. White's intention is to settle the shape; however, after 4 there are three ways for him to go wrong.




Dia. 15



Dia. 16


The first is to extend out at 1 in Dia. 16 and start a fight; when Black pulls back at 2, the fight becomes unreasonable for White. The continuation to 10 in Dia. 17 is to be expected, after which White is unable to come up with a satisfactory move. For example, if he slides out to 11, Black's attachment at 12 puts him in a bind. On the one hand,




fortable position. White can also consider the placement tesuji at 'f' instead of 1.

By the same token, it is not good for White to play elsewhere with 9 in Dia. 21 as Black will drop down at 1 in Dia.

23. White must answer at 2, otherwise a black play there would completely ruin his shape. After White 2 Black can make territory with 3 while simultaneously attacking the white group.




Dia. 23



Dia. 24

Transferring the joseki in Dia. 21 to the fuseki diagram leads to the result in Dia. 24. Black dominates the lower side, but since the bottom had little potential for development from the beginning, the result for him is not good. White, however, has scored a huge success on the right side by settling his stones. This is no doubt the result A had in mind when choosing the pressing move.

However, because the marked black stones in Dia. 25 are already in place, Black can forego 8 in Dia. 24 ('a' in Dia. 25) and offer resistance by switching to 4 in Dia. 25. If White blocks at 5, Black will then jump down to 6 and White will turn at 7. Up to 10 Black has been able to play on both sides and is satisfied. Because White has yet to make his one group completely safe, he will have to put off any thoughts of immedi-




Dia. 25


ately playing 'b'. If White tries to play 'b' instead of 5, Black will still jump down at 6.

C's Proposal


C has proposed the shoulder hit of 1 in Dia. 26. The idea behind this move is to build up strength against the corner by leaning on Black. The precondition for making it is that the position in the upper right is friendly, but in this case, the reverse is true, Black being strong there. Black naturally pushes up at 2, which combines beautifully with his thickness to form a deep black moyo.



Dia. 26




Dia. 27




Dia. 28


When this joseki is considered in isolation, Black has four replies, lettered 'a' to 'd' in Dia. 27, to the shoulder hit of 1. The black push at 1 in Dia. 28 treats the corner as a light area and emphasizes the right side and the center. It would be inconsistent with this strategy for Black to omit 3 after White 2 or 5 after White 4 and to extend to 'a', for example. Doing so would allow White to turn at either 3 or 'b' and would leave Black with an undesirable result.




Dia. 29



Dia. 30




Dia. 31



Dia. 32

After 5 White will play the pincer of 6 and Black will counter with the attachment of 7 in Dia. 29. Extending with 1 in Dia. 30 and letting Black get life in the corner is hopeless; consequently, White will play the kosumi at 8 in Dia. 31. He then answers the black hane by blocking at 10. At this point Black, too, should not cling to the corner and should initiate an exchange with the atari at 11 in Dia. 32. Through 16 White has taken the corner while Black has




Dia. 33

added even more to his thickness.

When the variation in Dia. 32 is played out against the fuseki diagram, Dia. 33 results. Because of his excellent thickness above, it is more powerful for Black to push once more at 6 instead of playing the knight's move at 'a'. Should White continue to extend out from 5, Black would continue to push. Black's moyo is enormous and because its two walls are solid, White is hard put to find a decent move in the area. At one stroke White's prospects have dimmed.

C was no doubt hoping for the joseki in Dia. 34, where Black attaches at 2 and White blocks at 3.



Dia. 34

In the continuation given here, when White cuts at 9, his group is completely settled. This is certainly not a bad result for White and is

probably what C expected.

(‘Gekkan Gogaku’, November 1980. Translated by David Thayer.)

1980 German Championship

As reported in GW20, the 1980 German championship was won by Jurgen Mattern of Berlin, with Bernd Wolter, also of Berlin, finishing second. The game between them follows with a commentary by Sakai Masanori 4-dan.

White: Jurgen Mattern 6-dan

Black: Bernd Wolter 4-dan

Played May 25, 1980 in Berlin.




Figure 1 (1 – 43)

Figure 1 (1 – 43)

Black 11. Joseki, but closing the top left corner would also be good.

White 18. Again joseki, but White 25, reducing the influence of Black 5–11, might be better. After Black 18, White could play ‘a’.


Black 19. This cut brings Black 5–11 to life.

Black 29. Giving White so much profit is questionable. The usual joseki has Black playing ‘b’ and 30 and living in the corner, and Black should probably have played that way.

White 34. A difficult move, but White ‘c’, probing Black’s response, looks interesting.

Black 39. This is much too submissive a reply to White 38.


Dia. 1. Black should play 1. If White 2 and 4, Black can attack with 5.



Dia. 1

White 40 gives Black a chance. White should jump to ‘d’ instead.

Black 41 misses the chance. Since Black has established strength at the edge with 39, he should attack directly from the center.




Dia. 2

Dia. 2. Black 1 is the move. If White plays 2, Black builds up the bottom left corner while attacking with 3 and 7.

White 42. The right idea, but White ‘e’ is preferable, because White’s main interest lies to the right, where he can split Black with ‘f’, or attack at ‘g’ (threatening ‘f’).

Black 43. Ineffective, because both the corner and the side are open. Black should close the corner with ‘h’. If White defends the center, Black closes the side too with ‘i’, securing a large territory.

Dia. 3. Black need not fear White 2. If White plays there, Black cuts him up with 3 and 5.



Dia. 3

Figure 2 (44–100)

White 44. Premature. White should defend the center at 71, preparing to invade next or to attack the black stones to the right.







Figure 2 (44 - 100)



Dia. 4



Dia. 5



Dia. 6

Black 47. Too passive for this situation.

Dia. 4. Black must play 1 and 3, steering the fight toward the bottom and right, where White has less freedom than on the left.

Dia. 5. If White 1 and 3, Black connects at 4. White is headed for a disaster.


Dia. 6. White can play this way and live, but the result is still good for Black.

Black 51. Unreasonable. If White plays 1 in Dia. 7, Black's attack fails.


Dia. 7. Black 2 through White 9 are one variation. Black comes off decidedly the worse. Note that 'a' is White's sente.

White 52. Clever, but dangerous.

Dia. 8. What if Black connects at 1? The triangled stone now becomes a real menace, and if White plays 2, Black cuts with 3 and 5.



Dia. 7



Dia. 8

Black 53. Fortunately for White, Black does not see the connection in Dia. 8.

White 54. White 55 is better style. If Black pushes through and cuts with Black 54, White 60, Black 56, White gives atari at 58 and crawls up the left side, sacrificing two stones.

Black 57. Black should capture White 52.

Black 61 gains very little, and should be held in reserve. Later Black might prefer to attack at 66.

White 70. White 'a' would be a much better way to live.

White 72. A somewhat heavy move, and a bad exchange for 73. White 82, Black 83, White 'b' might be the best defense, leaving the option of White 77 for later.

Black 75 is unnecessary, since if White plays there, Black can answer at 'c'. Black could therefore attack at 80.

White 76. White should just jump to 80.


Black 77 at 78 is possible, which is one reason White should not have played 76.

Black 79. If Black wants to attack, he must not cut here, but rather extend at 'd'. White 80 is then not sente.

White 84 ought to be at 86.

Black 85. Black could spoil White's shape by peeping at 1 in Dia. 9.

Dia. 9. Lacking a stone at 'a', White must connect at 2 or else be cut by Black 2. Black pushes at 3, then defends with 5.



Dia. 9





Figure 3 (101 - 150)

Figure 3 (101 - 150)

White 2. A one-space jump to 1 in Dia. 10 would defend this area better.

Black 5. Black 33 would have more effect on White's still unsettled center group, and would also be safer



Dia. 10

from Black's point of view. Black 5 leaves the danger of White 11 later. It is usually better to hane on top.

White 8. Knight's moves like this tend to invite cuts. White should give atari at 9, then jump straight out to 'a'.

White 10. Pushing at 38 is better.

Black 21-29. The danger involved in White 8 materializes. However, Black's next move is a mistake.




Figure 4 (151 - 265)

75 connects. 121 connects. 134, 137, 140: ko (around 107). 162, 165: connect ko.

Black 31. Black should play 34. If White links at 32, Black trades 'b' for 'c', then pushes through and cuts with 35 and 37. White's top center group is seriously short of eye shape, and his bottom center group is also unsettled, so something may die.

Black 33. Another slip. Black should give atari a line higher.

White 34-44. This gets one group out of danger.

Black 49. And this fails to make the strongest attack against the other group. Black should give atari at 'd'.

Figure 4 (151 - 265)

White 56. White is now alive and the game has been decided.

White wins by 10½ points.

Forcing Moves


Sakai Masanori 4-dan and James Davies

This time we will examine several types of non-atari contact forcing moves.


Dia. 1. For two common examples, take this position — White to play. Note that △ cannot escape, so it may as well be sacrificed.

Dia. 2. White's first forcing move is the hane at 1. Black is forced to make a bad empty triangle with 2.

Dia. 3. (next page) White follows with his second forcing move: the push at 3. Although




Dia. 1




Dia. 2

he is pushing from behind, the 3-4 exchange clearly favors him.




Dia. 3




Dia. 4

Dia. 4. To see how much White has gained, compare Dia. 3 with Dia. 4, in which White has neglected his forcing moves and Black has extended at 1. In Dia. 3, Black was pushed into a contorted, congested shape. In Dia. 4, however, both his profit and his influence are expanding, and White is on the verge of being confined to the corner.

Dia. 5. For another type of forcing move, take this position. Black wants to play 1, but there is a risk in his doing so directly.




Dia. 5




Dia. 6

Dia. 6. The risk is White 1. If Black connects at 2, White links out with 3 and 5, leaving Black without eye space.

Dia. 7. One possible solution to Black's problem is to thrust at 1. If White answers this forcing move at 2, then Black can safely block at 3.



Dia. 7




Dia. 8


Dia. 8. White 1 now fails completely.

Thrusting moves like Black 1 in Dia. 7 should usually be avoided, because the 1-2 exchange by itself favors White. In special situations, however, such thrusts can be extremely useful.


Five more contact forcing moves are shown in the next column. Not all are good. Try to evaluate each before turning the page.




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
2.



3.




4.




5.

1. Forcing move

Dia. 1. Black 1 is an excellent forcing move. White cannot avoid answering submissively at 2. If he omits 2, Black 2 captures two cutting stones.




Dia. 1



Dia. 2

Dia. 2. Black 3 makes a good continuation. Next White will extend along the bottom and Black can shift toward the left side. He is not worried about White's cutting at 'a', because he can play 'b' in sente.


2. Forcing move.



Dia. 3


Dia. 3. White 1 crushes Black's shape. Black 2 is an almost unbearable move to have to make, but there is no better alternative. If Black plays 2 at 'a', White 'b' becomes sente. After this forcing exchange, White 3 starts a strong attack.

3. Thank-you move



Dia. 4

Dia. 4. As long as the attach-and-extend joseki is played, there will probably be players who follow it up with Black 1, but this is an atrocious move. It strengthens White beautifully.




Dia. 5


Dia. 5. If Black is going to do anything, he should extend to 1. Next he has a potent invasion at 'a'.

4. Forcing move

Dia. 6. White 1 is a mandatory forcing move. Although made primarily for defensive purposes, it has the pleasing effect of forcing Black into an empty triangle. (If Black answers 1 at 'a', White 'b' becomes sente.)




Dia. 6



Dia. 7


Dia. 7. If White omits his forcing move, Black 1 causes him considerable trouble.

5. Forcing move




Dia. 8

Dia. 8. Black 1 is another good defensive forcing move. It prevents a white invasion at 'a'.




Dia. 9

Dia. 9. If White invades at 1, Black captures him with the greatest of ease. Without the forcing exchange in Dia. 8, however, this would be a different story.



Dia. 10

Dia. 10. Without the forcing exchange, White can invade at 1 and get clean away with 5. Black loses both territory and eye space.



Dia. 11

Dia. 11. Black could also defend his group by jumping to 1, but this would be gote and would have little effect on White.

1980 European Championship

The following game is the play-off of the 1980 European championship, in which Matthew Macfadyen beat Jurgen Mattern to take the title. Commentary by Sakai Masanori 4-dan.

Black: Macfadyen (Great Britain)

White: Mattern (West Germany)

At Mali Losinj in Yugoslavia




Figure 1 (1 - 21)

Figure 1 (1 - 21)


Black 1-7. Much could be said about this opening, but the discussion would necessarily be inconclusive. For example, the commentator would prefer to play White 4 at 10, and White 6 at 'a' for greater stability, but that is not to say that White 4 and 6 are bad moves.

White 8, however, should be a line to the left, between 8 and 'b'.

White 12 is loose and leaves the following weakness: if Black extends to 'b', then Black

'c', White 'd', Black 'e', White 'f', Black 'g' poses a serious threat. White should play 12 at 'd'.

Dia. 1. Black replies at 2. Although White has a weak point at 'a', Black cannot easily invade there because White 'b' in reply adversely affects the corner.




Dia. 1

White 14 should be 16, because if Black plays 15 at 16, he gets a very easy opening.


Black 15 could turn out to be badly placed if White enters the bottom left corner. Black 'h', completing the strong 'pillbox' shape, is the natural development from 3 and 7. Black 15 should be 16, closing the top left corner.

White 18 gives Black too good a reply, so —

Dia. 2. White should play diagonally at 1. If Black answers at 2 and 4, White cuts at 5 and fights. If Black now gives atari at 'a' —



Dia. 2



Dia. 3 11: ko

Dia. 3. White gives counter-atari at 7. The result through 13 is excellent for White, because his thickness nullifies Black's tengen stone. (Next if Black plays 'a', White plays 'b', or if

Black plays 'c', White plays 'd'.) Black may have other variations, but White can cope with them.

Black 19. A bold and beautiful move.




Figure 2 (22 - 50)

Figure 2 (22 - 50)

White 22 and 24 should be held in reserve. White loses the option of giving Black the area around 34 and making a large endgame move at 'a'. The correct development at this point is White 41, Black 31, White 'b'.


White 26 tries to do too much and ends up doing very little. White must play 41.

Black 27 is slightly overanxious. Black 31 would be better.


White 28 is heavy, especially because Black can link under at 'c'. Despite his commitment at 22 and 24, White should abandon this area and extend to 'b' on the lower side.

Black 35 is weak and leaves bad aji: White 'd', for example.

Dia. 4. Black should play 1, which makes a stronger shape.



Dia. 4




Dia. 5

Dia. 5. Black has nothing to fear from White 1 to 5, because he has an answering tesuji at 6.

Black 37. Black 'e' is correct, defending the bottom left more strongly. After 38 and 40, it becomes clear that Black would rather have 37 at 'e'.

Black 41. White now pays the price for his mistake at 26.

Black 43, however, should be at 48.



Dia. 6

Dia. 6. Following Black 1-5, White needs to add a stone at 6, so Black gets to extend to the right of 'b' in the figure.

White 48. It is now obvious that the 43-46 exchange is bad for Black.

White 50 is premature. White should extend to 'b', then think about invading the corner.




Figure 3 (51 - 100)

Figure 3 (51 - 100)


White 64. If White plays 65, then Black 'a', White 'b', Black 'c', White 'a', Black 78 gives a ko. White is totally unprepared for this ko because of the weakness of his center group, hence White 64.

Black 65. Thus ends White's premature invasion. Black now holds the lead.

White 66. White 'd' is better. If Black answers at 88, White should then play 'e'. White 'e' is sente against the black top group, and looks toward White 87 in the center.

White 68. Naturally 'f' is better.

White 72. White's last chance is to take the offensive as in Dia. 7.




Dia. 7

Dia. 7. After Black 2 to 6, White plays 7, attacking the two black groups in the upper half of the board.

When Black reduces White's territory and builds thickness with 73–79 and also gets sente to play 81, the game is essentially over.

Black 91 is a mistake in technique. If Black is going to sacrifice, he should play 92.



Dia. 8




Figure 4 (101 – 185)

Dia. 8. This sequence gives White six points less profit and Black has no cutting point.

Figure 4 (101 – 185)

Black 9. Black 14 is better. If White answers at 10 anyway, then clearly 14 is superior to 9, and if White answers 14 at 9, he has trouble with Black 17. However, it is too late for slight errors like this to change the outcome.

White is about ten points behind at the end.

White resigns at Black 185.

(Translated by James Davies)

Index to Issues 17 to 22

Note: page numbers are omitted for items given in the list of contents.

Abe Yoshiteru (born 1941) – see 'Special Game Commentary', GW17, 18, 20

'Advanced Tesuji Problems': GW18

Aguilar, Fernando (b. 1959) ... v. Lopez Herrero, 1979 South American Championship: GW18

... v. Kyung Kim, round one, 2nd World Amateur Go Championship: GW20

Aihara Kaseki (1698 – ?) ... v. Yara no Satonoshi, 1710: 'Page from Go History', GW20

Akagi Kazuo (b. 1921) ... v. Miyamoto Naoki, 21st Kansai Ki-in No. 1 Position: GW20, p. 41

Argentina – 1980 Argentine Ch'ship: GW22, p. 4

Awaji Shuzo (b. 1949) ... v. Sato Masaharu, 4th Kisei 7-dan final: GW19

'Basic Fighting Techniques' (Miyazawa Goro): GW17, 18, 20, 21

Baumann, HP (b. 1949) ... v. Gosteli, 1979 – 80 Swiss

Championship: GW17

Belgrade – 3rd Open Go Ch'ship: GW22, p. 3

Berlin – 4th International Berlin Go Tournament: GW19, p. 5

Britain – 1st British Schools Championship: GW19, p. 4

Budapest – 1980 Budapest International Handicap Go Tournament: GW20, p. 5

Canada – 1980 Canadian Open Go Ch'ship: GW22, p. 4
Ch'en Chai-jui (b. 1953) ... v. Yasunaga, semifinal, 2nd W. A. G. C.: GW19

... v. Imamura, final, 2nd W. A. G. C.: GW20

China – 1980 China - Japan Go Exchange: GW21

'China v. Japan: Nieh Wei-p'ing in Tokyo': GW17

Cho Chikun (b. 1956) – 'Profile of a Prodigy': GW22

... v. Rin Kaiho (1962): GW22, p. 28

... v. Otake, 5th Gosei title, Games 1–4: GW22

... v. Otake, 5th Meijin title, Games 1, 2: GW22

Cho Hun Hyen (b. 1953) – wins all eight Korean titles: GW21, p. 44

'Commonsense Tesuji Problems': GW17

'Commonsense Tesuji Problems': GW17

Davies, James — see 'Odd Man Out', 'Forcing Moves', 'Go in Lilliput'

Denmark — 1980 Danish Ch'ship: GW22, p. 3

Dosaku (1645–1702, 4th Honinbo) ... v. Peichin Hamahika, 1682: 'Page from Go History', GW18

Eastertide — 4th Eastertide International Tournament, Plzen: GW20, p. 6

'Easy Introduction to Go, An', by Otake Hideo and Sotoyoshi Futakuchi — reviewed: GW18, p. 61

Elsevier — 9th Elsevier International Tournament: GW17, p. 4; results: GW20, p. 5

endgame tesujis — see 'Good and Bad Style': GW18

Europe — 1980 European Championship, Mattern v. Macfadyen: GW22

'Failure of a Large Moyo' (Fujisawa Hosai v. Shiraishi Yutaka): GW18

Feldman, Denis ... v. Jean Michel, 1979 French Ch'ship: GW18

'Forcing Moves' (Sakai Masanori and James Davies): GW17, 18, 20, 22

France — 1979 French Ch'ship (Feldman v. Michel): GW18; 1980 Ch'ship: GW22, p. 4

'From Amateur to Professional' (Tomita Tadao): GW17, 18, 20, 21

Fujisawa Hosai (b. 1919) ... v. Ishida Akira, 6th Tengen prelim. round: GW18, p. 9

... v. Shiraishi Yutaka, 35th Honinbo league: GW18, p. 12

Fujisawa Shuko (b. 1925) ... v. Rin Kaiho, 4th Kisei title, Game 1: GW18; Games 2–5: GW19

... v. Sakata Eio, 1st Meijin tournament, 1962: GW21

Gaspari, Peter — wins 2nd Yugoslav Ch'ship: GW20, p. 4

Germany — 1980 German Ch'ship (Mattern v. Wolter): GW22

'Go Curiosity' — GW17 ('The 19-Stone Extension'); GW20 ('1-dan v. 9-dan')

'Go in Lilliput' (James Davies): GW17, 18, 20, 21

Go Seigen (b. 1914) ... v. Hashimoto Shoji, 1st Meijin Tournament, 1962: GW21

'Good and Bad Style': GW17, 18, 20, 22

Gosei — 5th Gosei playoff, Otake v. Honda: GW22; title match, Otake v. Cho, Games 1–4: GW22

Gosteli, Patrice ... v. H-P Baumann, 1979 – 80 Swiss Ch'ship: GW17

'Great Joseki Debate, The' (Honda Kuniyoshi): GW17–22

Hakugen (1726–54, 8th Honinbo) ... v. Satsugen: 'Page from Go History', GW17

Hashimoto Shoji (b. 1935) ... v. Rin Kaiho, 4th Kisei Stage Two final: GW19

... v. Rin Kaiho, 4th Kisei Stage Three final, games 1–3: GW19

... v. Go Seigen, 1st Meijin Tournament, 1962: GW21 wins 1979 NHK Cup: GW18, p. 5

Honda Kuniyoshi (b. 1945) ... v. Otake, 5th Gosei playoff, Games 1 & 2: GW22

Honda Sachiko (b. 1930) ... v. Yamamoto Yutaka: GW17, p. 30

Honinbo — 35th Honinbo league, Fujisawa Hosai v. Shiraishi Yutaka: GW18, p. 12; playoff, Takemiya v. Rin: GW21; title match, Kato v. Takemiya, Games 1–5: GW21

Hua I-kang ... v. Ishii Kunio: GW21

Hungary — 1979 Hungarian Ch'ship: GW20, p. 5

Imamura Fumiaki (b. 1949) .. v. Liu Hsiao-kuang, 2nd W.A.G.C. semifinal: GW19

... v. Ch'en Chai-jui, 2nd W.A.G.C. final: GW20

Inoue Shunseki Inseki (1707–72, 6th Inoue) ... v. Satsugen, 1766: 'Page from Go History', GW17

... v. Tagami Peichin, 1748: 'Page from Go History', GW21

'International Go in the Edo Period': 'Page from Go History', GW18, 20, 21

Ishida Akira (b. 1949) ... v. Fujisawa Hosai, 16th Tengen prelim. round: GW18, p. 9

Ishida Yoshio (b. 1948) ... v. Kato Masao, 27th Oza title, Game 1: GW17; Game 2: GW18

... v. Nieh Wei-p'ing: GW20, p. 14

wins 12th Haya-go Ch'ship: GW19, p. 2

Ishii Kunio (b. 1941) ... v. Rin Kaiho, 4th Kisei 9-dan final: GW19

... v. Hua I-kang: GW21

Judan — 18th Judan tournament chart: GW20, p. 17; prizemoney: GW20, p. 26; winners' section final,

Otake v. Kudo: GW17, p. 26

playoff, Otake v. Kudo: GW20

title match, Otake v. Kato; games 1–5: GW20

Kada Katsuji (b. 1931) ... v. Kuwahara Munehisa: GW22, p. 41

Kajiwaru Takeo (b. 1923) ... v. Nieh Wei-p'ing: GW17, p. 18

Kanda Ei (b. 1961) ... v. Yang Hui: GW21

Kansai Ki-in prizes for 1979: GW18, p. 4

Kansai Ki-in — 21st Kansai Ki-in No. 1 Position (1977), Akagi v. Miyamoto Naoki: GW20, p. 41

Kataoka Satoshi (b. 1958) ... v. Nieh Wei-p'ing: GW17, p. 21

... v. Kato Masao, 5th Tengen title, Games 1–3: GW18

Kato Masao (b. 1947) ... v. Ishida Yoshio, 27th Oza title, Game 1: GW17; Game 2: GW18

... v. Kataoka Satoshi, 5th Tengen title, Games 1–3: GW18

v. Rin Kaiho, 4th Kisei, Stage Three quarterfinal: GW19

... v. Otake, 18th Judan title, Games 1–5: GW20

... v. Takemiya, 35th Honinbo title, Games 1–5: GW21

See 'Some Popular Trick Moves': GW21

Kerwin, James (b. 1946) ... v. Komatsu Fujio, 4th Kisei, Stage Two: GW19

'Kido' prizes for 1979: GW18, p. 3

Kikuchi Yasuro — wins 1980 Amateur Best Ten: GW20, p. 4

Kim, Kyung (b. 1942) ... v. Ronald Schlemper, 2nd W.A.G.C.: GW19

... v. Fernando Aguilar, 1st W.A.G.C.: GW20

Kisei — 4th Kisei title match, Fujisawa Shuko v. Rin Kaiho, Game 1: GW18; Games 2–5: GW19

Full report on 4th Kisei tournament: GW19

Kiyonari Tetsuya ... v. K'ung Shang-ming: GW21

Kobayashi Koichi (b. 1952) ... v. Sakai, 4th Kisei 8-dan final: GW19

... v. Nieh Wei-p'ing: GW21

Komatsu Fujio (b. 1959) ... v. James Kerwin, 4th Kisei stage two: GW19

Kudo Norio (b. 1940) ... v. Otake, 18th Judan winners'

- section final: GW17, p. 26
 ... v. Otake: 18th Judan playoff: GW20
 K'ung Shang-ming (b. 1955) ... v. Kiyonari Tetsuya: GW21
 Kuwahara Munehisa (b. 1923) ... v. Kada: GW22, p. 41
 'Life and Death Page': GW17
 life and death — see 'Good and Bad Style': GW22
 Linn, Chris — records rock song about go: GW19, p.4
 Liu Hsiao-kuang (b. 1960) ... v. Imamura, 2nd W.A.G.C. semifinal: GW19
 ... v. Yasunaga, 2nd W.A.G.C.: GW20
 Lopez Herrero (b. 1959) ... v. Fernando Aguilar, 1979 South American Ch'ship: GW18
 Luxembourg International Go Tournament: GW20, p. 6: GW22, p. 4
 Macfadyen, Matthew (b. 1953) ... v. Jurgen Mattern, 1980 European Ch'ship playoff: GW22
 Mattern, Jurgen (b. 1944) ... v. Bernd Wolter, 1980 German Ch'ship: GW22
 ... v. Matthew Macfadyen, 1980 European Ch'ship playoff: GW22
 Meijin — 1st Meijin Tournament, 1961–62: GW21
 4th Meijin title, Otake v. Sakata, Game 5: GW17
 5th Meijin prelim. round, Yamashiro v. Sonoda: GW17, p. 12; Sugiuchi v. Shinkai: GW 20, p. 57
 5th Meijin title match, Otake v. Cho Chikun, Game 1 & 2: GW22
 Michel, Jean ... v. Denis Feldman, 1979 French Ch'ship: GW18
 Miyamoto Naoki (b. 1934) ... v. Akagi Kazuo, 21st Kansai Ki-in No. 1 Position: GW20, p. 41
 Miyazawa Goro (b. 1949) — wins 5th Shinjin-O title: GW20, p. 4
 See 'Basic Fighting Techniques'
 Mizuno Hiroshi (b. 1936) ... v. Wu Sung-sheng: GW21
 Montreal-Honinbo, 1980: GW19, p. 5
 New Zealand — 1980 Ch'ship: GW22, p. 3
 Nieh Wei-p'ing (b. 1952) ... v. Takemiya: GW17
 ... v. Kajiwaru: GW17
 ... v. Kataoka: GW17
 ... v. Ishida Yoshio: GW20
 1st Nordic Championship: GW19, p. 3
 'Odd Man Out' (Ogawa Tomoko and James Davies): GW17, 18, 20, 21
 Ogawa Tomoko (b. 1951) — defends Women's Honinbo title: GW19, p. 3; see 'Odd Man Out'
 Olsson, Per-Inge — wins 1st Nordic Ch'ship: GW19, p. 3
 onadare — new variation: see GW19, pp. 30 – 31
 O-Senchi — see Yasui Senchi
 Otake Hideo (b. 1942) ... v. Sakata Eio, 4th Meijin title, Game 5: GW17
 ... v. Kudo Norio, 18th Judan, winners' section final: GW17, p. 26
 ... v. Sato Masaharu, 4th Kisei Stage Three quarter-final: GW19; semifinal v. Rin: GW19
 ... v. Kudo, 18th Judan playoff: GW20
 ... v. Kato, 18th Judan title, Games 1–5: GW20
 ... v. Honda Kuniyoshi, 5th Gosei playoff, Games 1 & 2: GW22
 ... v. Cho Chikun, 5th Gosei title, Games 1–4: GW22
 ... v. Cho Chikun, 5th Meijin title, Games 1 & 2: GW22
 oteai (rating tournament) — 1979 results: GW17, p. 3
 Oza — 27th Oza title match, Ishida v. Kato, Game 1: GW17; Game 2: GW18
 'Page from Go History': GW17–18, 20–22
 Peichin Hamahika ... v. Dosaku, 1682: 'Page from Go History': GW18
 Philippines — first go club: GW19, p. 4
 'Practical Tactics and Tesuji' (Rin Kaiho): GW17
 Prague — 10th International Handicap Tourn.: GW19, p. 4
 prizemoney — 1979 statistics: GW18, p. 4
 'Profile of a Prodigy': GW22
 Quebec — 2nd Open Go Ch'ship: GW19, p. 3
 Redmond, Michael (b. 1963): GW18, p. 5
 Rehm, Robert — wins 1980 London Open: GW17, p. 4
 Retsugen (1750 – 1808, 10th Honinbo) ... v. Yasui Senchi, 1787: 'Page from Go History', GW22
 Rin Kaiho — see 'Practical Tactics and Tesuji'
 ... v. Ishii Kunio, 4th Kisei 9-dan final: GW19
 ... v. Sato Masaharu, 4th Kisei Stage Two semifinal: GW19
 ... v. Hashimoto Shoji, 4th Kisei Stage Two final: GW19
 ... v. Kato, Stage Three quarterfinal: GW19
 ... v. Otake, Stage Three semifinal: GW19
 ... v. Hashimoto Shoji, Stage Three final, Games 1–3: GW19
 ... v. Fujisawa Shuko, 4th Kisei title match, Game 1: GW18; Games 2–5: GW19
 ... v. Takemiya, 35th Honinbo league playoff: GW21
 'Sacrifice Tesuji Problems': GW21
 Sakai Masanori (b. 1930) — see 'Forcing Moves'
 Sakai Takeshi (b. 1948) ... v. Kobayashi Koichi, 4th Kisei 8-dan final: GW19
 Sakata Eio (b. 1920) ... v. Otake Hideo, 4th Meijin title, Game 5: GW17
 ... v. Fujisawa Shuko, 1st Meijin title, 1962: GW20
 Sato Masaharu (b. 1947) ... v. Awaji Shuzo, 4th Kisei 7-dan final: GW19
 Satsugen (1733–88, 9th Honinbo) ... v. Inoue Shunseki Inseki: 'Page from Go History', GW17
 ... v. Hakugen: 'PGH', GW17
 Schlemper, Ronald (b. 1961) ... v. Kyung Kim, 2nd W.A.G.C.: GW19
 becomes an insei: GW21, p. 4
 Senchi — see Yasui Senchi
 Shinkai Hiroko (b. 1958) ... v. Sugiuchi: GW20, p. 57
 Shiraishi Yutaka (b. 1941) ... v. Fujisawa Hosai, 35th Honinbo league: GW18, p. 12
 Shunseki — see Inoue Shunseki Inseki
 Slovenia — 1979 Slovenian Ch'ship: GW17, p. 4
 sogo (challenge matches): 'Page from Go History', GW17
 'Some Popular Trick Moves': GW21
 Sonoda Yuichi (b. 1952) ... v. Yamashiro Hiroshi, 5th Meijin prelim. round: GW17, p. 12
 South America — 1979 Ch'ship: GW18
 'Special Game Commentary': GW17, 18, 20, 21, 22
 statistics for 1979: GW18, pp. 3–5
 'Strange Fusekis — Past and Present': GW20, 22
 'Submarine Attack, The': GW17
 Sugiuchi Masao (b. 1920) ... v. Shinkai: GW20, p. 57
 Swiss Ch'ship, 1979 – 80: GW17
 Tagami Peichin ... v. Inoue Shunseki Inseki, 1748: 'Page from Go History', GW21
 Takemiya Masaki (b. 1951) ... v. Nieh Wei-p'ing: GW17
 ... v. Rin Kaiho, 35th Honinbo league playoff: GW21

... v. Kato Masao, 35th Honinbo title match, Games 1–5: GW21
 Tengen – 5th Tengen title match, Kato v. Kataoka, Games 1–3: GW18; 6th Tengen prelim. round, Ishida Akira v. Fujisawa Hosai: GW18, p. 9
 title-winners : GW20, p. 4
 Tomita Tadao – see ‘From Amateur to Professional’ tournament results for 1979: GW18, p. 5
 Wang Ch’un (b. 1958) ... v. Yasunaga, round two, 2nd W.A.G.C.: GW20
 Wolter, Bernd (b. 1956) ... v. Jurgen Mattern, 1980 German Ch’ship: GW22
 World Amateur Go Championship, 2nd (1980) – list of competitors: GW17, p. 5; report and games: GW19, 20

Wu Sung-sheng ... v. Mizuno Hiroshi: GW21
 Yamamoto Yutaka (b. 1917) ... v. Honda Sachiko: GW17, p. 30
 Yamashiro Hiroshi (b. 1958) ... v. Sonoda Yuichi, 5th Meijin prelim. round: GW17, p. 12
 Yang Hui ... v. Kanda Ei: GW21
 Yara no Satonoshi ... v. Aihara Kaseki, 1710: ‘Page from Go History’, GW20
 Yasui Senchi Senkaku (1764–1837, 7th Yasui) ... v. Retsugen (1787): ‘Page from Go History’, GW22
 Yasunaga Hajime (b. 1902) ... v. Ch’en Chai-jui, 2nd W.A.G.C. semifinal: GW19
 ... v. Liu Hsiao-kuang, 2nd W.A.G.C.: GW20
 ... v. Wang Ch’un, 2nd W.A.G.C.: GW20
 Yugoslavia – 1979 Yugoslav Team Ch’ship: GW17, p. 4; 2nd Yugoslav Ch’ship: GW20, p. 4

Page from Go History

The Great Senchi – Forerunner of New Fuseki

After the extended interlude on international go, it is time to return to our chronological survey of Edo period go. In ‘Go World’ 17 we left the 9th Honinbo Satsugen (1733–88) ensconced at the peak of the go world, having trounced Inoue Shunseki Inseki in their sogo (challenge match) in 1766–67, thus clearing his way to the position of Meijin (1767) and godokoro (1770). Satsugen completely dominated his contemporaries, but he amply fulfilled his responsibilities as Meijin and made a large contribution to a revival in the prosperity of go.

Satsugen’s heir was Yamamoto Retsugen (1750–1808), who became the 10th Honinbo on Satsugen’s death in 1788. Retsugen was a player of considerable ability who reached 8-dan in 1801; he also holds the record for the highest number of castle games (o-shiro-go) played – 46 games over a period of thirty-five years, his results being an even 21 wins to 21 losses, with 4 jigo. Retsugen also further elevated the position of the Honinbo house by arranging for the Honinbo heir to be ranked above the heirs of the other three houses (the previous order was based on the chronological order in which they were appointed as heir).

Despite these achievements, however, Retsugen shared the limelight with the 7th head of the Yasui house, Yasui Senchi Senkaku (1764–1837), who is usually known as the Great Senchi (O-Senchi) to distinguish him from other Yasui

heads with the same name.

Segoe Kensaku considers Senchi the greatest Yasui player after Chitoku, the 8th Yasui, and calls him the forerunner of modern go strategy. Senchi developed a centre-oriented style which had a strong influence on the development of New Fuseki in the 1930’s, in particular, on its co-founder, Kitani Minoru, who called Senchi his favourite player from the classical period. The 14th Honinbo, Shuwa (1820–73) was also a fan of Senchi, whom he considered ‘the most spectacular player of his period’.

Senchi would stake out high positions in the fuseki, then fight fiercely in the middle game. He had an excellent o-shiro-go record of 18 wins, 9 losses, 2 jigo over 31 years, but his record against Retsugen was even more impressive. The latter was only able to win two out of the fifteen games (no jigo) they played, though admittedly he must have been handicapped by the difference in age. There is an interesting irony in this. The 4th Honinbo, Dosaku, had outstripped his Yasui school rivals because of his fuseki advances, but now the Yasui head was crushing the Honinbo with his pioneering fuseki.

The most famous game between these two is given in Chapter Three of ‘Appreciating Famous Games’, but here we will look at a game which both players would undoubtedly have preferred to erase from the historical record.

“A Joint Oversight by Quasi-Meijins”

The above is the tag by which the game given here is known to go history. Strictly speaking, the players did not become quasi-Meijin (i. e. 8-dan) until some fourteen years after the game was played, but it did become famous for a tesuji which they both missed.

White: Retsugen 7-dan, Honinbo heir

Black: Yasui Senchi Senkaku 6-dan (O-Senchi)

date: 11th May, 1787

Black wins by 13 points.

Commentary by Kitani Minoru 9-dan






Figure 1 (1 - 53)



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

Figure 1 (1 - 53)

White 12. If at 1 in Dia. 1, Black can cut with 2, as the ladder favours him.


Black 13 is a thick move, but extending to 'a' to forestall White 14 would also be a good move.

White 14. If at 15, then Black will play 14.


White 20. If White blocked at 1 in Dia. 2, Black would have no trouble living, the sequence to 10 here being one possibility.

Black 27 is very aggressive. If Black just wanted


to escape, he could easily break through White's wall with the combination of 1 and 5 in Dia. 3.




Dia. 3



Dia. 4



Dia. 5



Dia. 6

Black 35. Black could also simply extend at 1 in Dia. 4. White would have to play 2 to forestall the ladder, so Black could then cut at 3. If White 4, Black would capture two stones with 5 to 9. However, instead of 4 —

Dia. 5. White could play 1 and 3. Since White takes profit at the top and on the side (if Black 'a', White 'b'), Senchi was presumably dissatisfied with this result.

White 42 is an important tesuji. If White simply played at 1 in Dia. 6, Black would attach at 2. Since Black 'a' would be sente, White would not be able to stop Black from getting at ladder at 'b'.

After Black 53, White played to the right of 47, capturing four black stones, but letting Black capture the white stones at the top. However, White actually has an exquisite two move combination here which was overlooked by both players. Can you find it before turning the page?





Figure 2 (54 - 100)



Dia. 7

Figure 2 (54 - 100)

White 54. White 1 in Dia. 7 is the move which both players missed. Black has no choice but to extend at 2, whereupon White has an exquisite continuation at 3. The latter move is easy to overlook because it makes such bad shape. In fact, however, this clever combination saves both the white stones at the top and the stones in the centre, as Black cannot get a ladder with 'a'.

The tesuji in Dia. 7 was discovered by a spectator, Wakayama Ritcho, then 3-dan, who pointed it out to the players after the game, causing them both considerable embarrassment. The oversight became famous when Gennan Inseki (1798 - 1859, the 11th Inoue), discussed it in his book 'Igo Myoden' (Curious Go Stories), published in 1852.

Black would have been in a lot of trouble if White had followed Dia. 7, whereas the exchange to 59 in the figure is favourable for him. All he has to do now to keep ahead is to get a reasonable result when he invades at the bottom.

Black 93 is an interesting move. With 94, White desperately tries to stop Black from getting two eyes, but he clearly has an uphill job.







Figure 3 (101 - 150)



Dia. 8



Dia. 9




Dia. 10

Figure 3 (101 - 150)

White 4. White 1 in Dia. 8 would be a big move, but then Black would secure his group with 2 and 4. White's strategy in the figure is to use his attack on Black to build a large centre.

Black 9 may look strange, but it is quite a clever move. If White resists with 1 in Dia. 9, Black lives with 2 and 4. Instead of 3 -

Dia. 10. If White 1 here, Black escapes with 2




Dia. 11

and 4.


White 18. White cannot block at 23.

Dia. 11. If White 1, Black 2 and 4 give a seme-ai. If White 'a' next, Black easily wins with 'b', White 'c', Black 'd', White 'e'. Making an eye with White 'a' at 'b' is no good because of Black 'e'.

White 36 and Black 37 are more or less miai.



Dia. 12



Dia. 13




Figure 4 (151 - 200)

ko: 56, 59, 62.

Figure 4 (151 - 200)

Black 67. The exchange to 71 is forced. If Black played at 1 in Dia. 12, White would cut at 2. If Black cannot win the ko at 'a', he would have to defend at 3, but then he would have no answer to White 4.

White 82. It is not advisable to cut at 1 in Dia. 13, as Black has the tesuji of 2. If White 3, Black counters with 4 and 6, but if White compromises with 3 at 5 Black uses the atari at 'a' to reduce White's territory.

Moves after 250 not recorded.

Black wins by 13 points.

(Commentary from 'Kido', September 1963)




Figure 5 (201 - 250)

ko: 29, 32, 35, 38, 41; 43: at 36; ko: 44, 47, 50

This game is a good example of Senchi's aggressive style. In the next issue we will look at some games that demonstrate his affinity with New Fuseki.

